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ABSTRACT
The duty to disclose, as set forth by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 and case law from the Federal
Circuit, should be followed during the prosecution of all patent applications. This
duty requires that inventors and their attorneys provide the United States Patent
and Trademark Office with a list identifying relevant publications, patent
applications, patents, legal proceedings, written rejections from patent examiners,
and sales, both public and confidential. "Relevant" means relevant to the claims.
The consequences of failing in this duty can be severe, namely, a holding of
inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct, in the patenting context, requires two
prongs-materiality of the publication and intent to deceive the Patent Office.
Patent practitioners are confronted by many gray areas, e.g., the boundaries of the
duty, whether disclosing an Abstract can satisfy the duty of disclosing the
corresponding full length publication, how to remedy situations where an inventor
failed to timely disclose the publication, and how to assess deceptive intent.
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE: DAYCO PRODUCTS V. TOTAL CONTAINMENT

TOM BRODY*

"We leave for another day a final disposition of this issue"'

INTRODUCTION
The duty to disclose information to the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO") is a major issue for the patent practitioner. Failure to disclose can
have severe consequences, for example, invalidation of your patent and all related
patents in the patent family. Guidance for this duty comes from 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
("Rule 56"), as well as from relevant cases from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"). In March 1992, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 was
amended, resulting in a standard that was narrower and more clearly defined. The
pre-March 1992 standard encompassed any information that a reasonable examiner
might find important in evaluating a patent application, while the post-March 1992
standard more narrowly encompassed only information relevant to patentability of
the claims.
In general, the Federal Circuit has continued to follow the broad standard, that
is, the standard articulated in established case law and by the pre-March 1992
administrative law. However, in a few opinions, the Federal Circuit and the U.S.
district courts have opted to follow the narrower administrative standard. The result
is a periodic but continuing inconsistency in the application of the duty to disclose.
Another inconsistency, which confronts the patent attorney on a day-to-day
basis, is that the narrower administrative law (37 C.F.R. § 1.56) directly governs the
information (publications; evidence of sale or public use) that must be provided with
every patent application, while the attorney must also take into account the broader
Federal Circuit standard that might be applied by the court in a downstream
litigation. The problem here is that by the time litigation is initiated, it is too late for
the patent attorney to disclose information that should have been submitted during
the prosecution phase of the patent.
2
In 2003, the Federal Circuit in Dayco Products,Inc. v. Total Containment,Inc.
confronted the problem of the two different standards for the duty to disclose, but
chose not to resolve the issue at the time, writing, "we leave for another day a final
disposition of this issue."3
The thirteen years of uncertainty, regarding the
application of these two standards, seemed to have been brought to an end with two

*The author is a registered patent agent in the San Francisco Bay area (tom5brody@aol.com).
He received a Ph.D. in biochemistry in 1980 from the University of California at Berkeley, and has
prosecuted forty-five patent applications, and authored twenty research publications and two
editions of a textbook.
1 Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2_d.
3 Id.
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decisions from 2005. Both of these decisions, Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v.
Acorn Mobihlty Services, Ltd.4 and Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals
Inc., 5 held that the federal courts should give deference to the USPTO's formulation
of the standard of materiality at the time an application is being prosecuted. 6 For
example, the court in Purdue Pharma (emphasis added) wrote, "[i]n evaluating
materiality, this court has consistently referred to the standard set forth in PTO
Rule 56 ... [because all of the patent applications at issue in this case were pending
on or filed after March 16, 1996 [the post-March 1992 standard], we look to the
current version of Rule 56."7 On the other hand, later in the year 2006, the Federal
Circuit revived the era of uncertainty by holding that both standards were valid, and
that it was acceptable for the court to apply the broad standard, the narrow
standard, or both standards (DigitalControl, Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, Agfa
Corp. v. Creo Products,Inc.,9 and FerringB. V v. BarrLaboratories,Inc.10).
This essay discloses the two different standards for the duty to disclose,
documents the continuing inconsistency in the courts in applying the pre-March 1992
and post-March 1992 standards for the duty to disclose, and discloses doctrines that
apply uniquely to the duty to disclose, such as the Doctrine of Infectious
Unenforceability. This essay details an array of techniques for convincing a court to
render a holding of inequitable conduct, thereby resulting in the unenforceability of a
patent. By disclosing these techniques, this essay inherently provides guidance on
how better to satisfy the duty to disclose.
The patent applicant has a duty to disclose certain forms of information to the
USPTO by way of an information disclosure statement ("IDS"), where the IDS is
accompanied by a list identifying the documents, as well as copies of the actual
documents. The IDS, the list, and clean copies of publications and any other
documents need to be submitted in a parent patent application, whereas in daughter
or child patent applications, the applicant need only submit the IDS and the list, but
not the copies. A reissue application is not considered to be a daughter patent
application because the reissue application is not co-pending with the parent, and
here the IDS, the list, and clean copies, all need to be re-submitted.
Failure to disclose information by way of an IDS can be particularly severe,
resulting in a holding of inequitable conduct as to the inventor's alleged deceptive
behavior in prosecuting one or more claims in the pending patent application or the
issued patent.
Where inequitable conduct is found, the court will render
unenforceable all of the claims in the patent or patent application.1 1 The court may
even render unenforceable all relatedpatents and patent applications,that is, the
parent, sibling, and daughter patents, by way of a doctrine called infectious

4 394 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
410 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rehbggranted,438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
6 Bruno Indep. LivingAids, 349 F.3d at 1353; Purdue Pharma,410 F.3d at 696.

7 Purdue Pharma,438 F.3d at 1129.
8 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (employing the "reasonable examiner" standard of

review, and noting that the PTO's adoption of Rule 56 does not supplant this earlier standard).
9 451 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
10437 F.3d 1181, 1187 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
11J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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unenforceability. 12 The duty to disclose, as it applies to disclosing publications,
13
public uses, and sales, has been reviewed.

I. LANGUAGE IN AN INFORMATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Publications, documentation of sales and public uses, and confidential
documents such as laboratory data, can be submitted to the USPTO by way of an
IDS, where the IDS is accompanied by copies of the documents. The IDS is the gold
standard for determining whether a reference has been properly disclosed to the
USPTO. An important characteristic of this gold standard is that it identifies the
references in a neutral manner, and refrains from characterizing any cited
publications as "prior art."
Where an applicant or inventor characterizes a
publication as "prior art," the result is that the patent examiner will have a stronger
case in arguing that the claims should be invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103,
based on that publication.
The IDS generally contains a stock statement regarding the references cited on
the accompanying list. The statement can take the following form:
Citation of these documents should not be construed as a
representation that the documents are in fact material or are in fact prior
art with respect to the instant invention. The examiner should not make
any inference relating to the relative pertinence of cited references based
upon the order in which the art is presented. Citation of these documents
should not be construed as a representation that an exhaustive search has
14
been made or that more pertinent art may not be in existence.
This neutral manner is consistent with the language of 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h), a
rule that became effective on March 16, 1992.15
The phrase implies that the
applicant is not aware of any references that are of greater materiality than those
cited. In contrast, a stock phrase in an IDS, taking a different form than that quoted

12 Baxter Int'l v. McGaw, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1313, 1315-16 (N.D. Ill. 1997), affd in part,rev'd
in part, 149 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing the district court decision and holding patents
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct).
13 Kenneth R. Adamo, Recent Developments in Inequitable Conduct: The (Statutory)Duty of
Discosure? "Fraud"On the P.TO., 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 110, 120 (1991); Kenneth R.
Adamo & Robert P. Ducatman, The Status of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct Before the Office:
"Violation of the Duty of Disclosure" out of 'Inequitable Conduct" by 'Fraud" 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 193, 194 (1986); Irving Kayton et al., Fraud in Patent Procurement:
Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1, 32-33 (1974); John F. Lynch, Evolution and
Future of New Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor:New Rule 56." The Second Time Around 20 AIPLA
Q.J. 144, 158 (1992); Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Evolution and Future ofNew Rule 56 and the Duty of
Candor: The Evolution and Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 140-41 (1992); R. Carl Moy,
The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
257, 257-58 (1992); Harold C. Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the ProperRoles ofPatentAttorney
and Examinerin an Era of InternalPatentHarmonization,16 AIPLA Q.J. 38, 50-64 (1988).
14See Content of Information Disclosure Statement, 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2006).
15 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10)
[hereinafter Duty of Disclosure].
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above, raised the issue of whether a cited reference was prior art. The following
phrase is from Riverwood International Corp. v. R.A. Jones & C'.16: "The prior art
references listed constitute the closest art of which the Applicant is aware relating to
the invention of the above identified application. The applicant discloses and claims
17
an invention over this prior art."
Because of the nature of this particular stock phrase, it was argued that the
submitted IDS identified one of the references (the '806 patent), and transformed it
into prior art by admission. The defendant asserted that patentee's IDS transformed
the '806 patent into prior art. In making this assertion, the defendant's goal was to
shift the burden to the patentee to argue why the reference was not prior art.
Therefore, it is best for the language in the IDS to set forth the references disclosed
therein in neutral terms. Prior art by admission was an issue in other cases, for
example in In re Fout1 8 and In re Nomiya.19 Admitting that a reference is prior art
can trigger the duty to disclose the prior art reference.

II.

MATERIALITY AND INTENT ARE USED To DETERMINE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

As first set forth by the Federal Circuit in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa
& Sons, Inc., 20 a finding of inequitable conduct, due to a failure to disclose involves a
balancing of materiality and intent. 21 For example, if there is only a slight hint or
indication of intent to deceive the USPTO, there can still be a finding of inequitable
conduct, where the non-disclosed reference is highly material.22 But if the reference
is only somewhat material or slightly material, there can still be a finding of
inequitable conduct, where there exists direct "smoking gun" evidence of deceptive
scheming to conceal the reference.23 As set forth in Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v.
Stryker Sales Corp.,24 and other cases, 25 the Federal Circuit has described this
sliding scale as follows: "When balanced against high materiality, the showing of
intent can be proportionally less."26 Where it is not possible to detect any intent to
deceive, it is improper to arrive at a holding of inequitable conduct. M. Eagles Tool
Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co. 27 held that the sliding scale must be used, and
that "t]here still must be a factual basis ... for a finding of intent.., when the
absence of a good faith explanation is the only evidence of intent, however, that
evidence alone does not constitute clear and convincing evidence warranting an
28
inference of intent."
16 324 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
17Id. at 1351.
18 675 F.2d 297, 301 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
19 509 F.2d 566, 571 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
20 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21 Id. at 1364.
22 Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.N.J. 1989); Critikon, Inc.
v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
23 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
24 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
26 Brasseker, 267 F.3d at 1380.
27 439 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
28 Id. at 1341.
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It is proper for a court to infer intent to deceive where there is no smoking gun.
In fact, the available case law demonstrates that, where there has been a holding of
inequitable conduct, intent to deceive was almost always inferred. The available case
law demonstrates that intent is usually inferred, and seldom direct. Kingsdown
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,Inc., 29 in a limited en banc hearing, held that
some actual evidence for intent, that is, evidence beyond mere negligence must be
shown. 30 The en banc hearing held that gross negligence alone cannot justify an
31
inference of intent to deceive.
Inequitable conduct's use of this balancing act is to be contrasted with findings
of fraud. For a finding of fraud, a balancing act is not used, and here there must be
independent findings of high materiality and of direct evidence of scheming and
intent to deceive, as set forth in NobelpharmaAB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,3 2 and
33
other cases.
The following clarifies what is prior art that is highly material versus prior art
that is slightly material. A prior art publication that is highly material can be one
that discloses the entire claim of an inventor's patent, that is, one that discloses each
and every one of the elements of the claim. This type of publication would be suitable
for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (anticipation). Another type of publication that
is highly material is a publication by the inventor named on the patent, where the
publication discloses that the claimed invention does not work. In contrast, a
publication that discloses all of the elements of a claim except for one element can be
characterized as only somewhat material. This type of publication may be suitable
for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (obviousness).

III. THREE STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY
Materiality of a reference has been defined by three standards. The first
standard is whether a reasonable examiner would consider the information
important in deciding to allow the application to issue as a patent (37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)
(1991); the pre-March 1992 standard; reasonable examiner standard). The second
standard is whether the reference establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim (37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1)
(1992); the post-March 1992 standard; prima facie unpatentability standard). The
third standard is whether it would have conclusively established unpatentability,
that is, after the following three events-articulation of a prima facie case of
unpatentability by the examiner, rebuttal by the applicant, and reconsideration by
the examiner.
The post-March 1992 Rule 56 contains a clause that distinguishes this rule from
the third standard: "A prima facie case of unpatentability is established ... before
any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to
863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 873.
31 Jd.at 876.
32141 F.3d 1059, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex
Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
29

30
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establish a contrary conclusion of patentability"3 4 This third standard, which is not
properly used when assessing materiality of a reference, is essentially the same as
the "but for" standard. The "but for" standard has been alluded to in only a handful
of cases, for example, N. V Akzo v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 35 and Argus
Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-EvercoatCo.3 6 To repeat, the third standard is not an
appropriate standard in patent law.
37
The pre-March 1992 standard is described in A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.
and Li Second Family L.P. v. Toshiba Corp.,3 8 where the Federal Circuit wrote that
the test for materiality is whether a reasonable examiner would have considered the
information important. 39 In other words, the pre-March 1992 standard was not
whether the reference would likely serve as a basis for a finding of prima facie
unpatentabilty, for example, under where the patent examiner imposes a rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Discussions of material information usually concern
references of a type that could be used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102,
103, or 112, that is, references of a sort that are properly disclosed in an IDS.
Failure to disclose a reference that could lead to a rejection for double patenting
can also be an issue in determining inequitable conduct. Double patenting rejections
occur where one inventor (or assignee) owns two patents, and where the two patents
40
contain claims that are either identical to each other, or similar to each other.
Where two patent applications are being considered by the same examiner, the
inventor should ensure that the examiner is aware of both applications. Also, where
the two patent applications are being considered by different examiners, the inventor
should ensure that both examiners are aware of both applications. Where double
patenting is an issue or potential issue, failure to disclose can lead to a finding of
41
inequitable conduct and a rendering of unenforceability of the relevant patents.
An IDS is most often used to submit publications, as well as grant applications,
brochures, advertisements, information on sales and public uses, confidential pages
from laboratory notebooks, and information disclosing collaborations between various
inventors. Generally, the IDS is used to list and disclose publications and patents.
However, failure to disclose other forms of information can be used in determining
inequitable conduct due to failure to disclose a material reference. Small entity
status, which has essentially no relationship to the patentability of claims, is
normally disclosed on the transmittalform.42 Deceptive information relating to small

entity status can influence the court's thoughts on whether failure to submit a
43
publication was with deceptive intent. Inventorship is disclosed by the oath.
Priority is disclosed in the first paragraph of the patent's specification.44 Sources of
M 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)(ii) (2006).
, 810 F.2d 1148, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
36 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
'37 798

F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

38 231 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
39

A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1397; Li SecondFamily,231 F.3d at 1379.

40 See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 9.01 (2007).

41See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 925 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
42See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(c) (2006).
43 Id. § 1.63(a)(2).

44 Id. § 1.78(a).
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federal funding are disclosed on the first page of the specification.45 Ownership is
disclosed on the assignment.46 These types of information are properly disclosed by
formats other than an IDS. But if the information is withheld or incorrect, the
oversight can provoke a court to find inequitable conduct for failure to disclose a
typical publication.

A. Relative to Each Other, the Pre-March1992 StandardIs Anti-PatentHolder,
While the Post-March 1992 StandardIs Pro-PatentHolder.
Relative to each other, the earlier standard is anti-patent holder, while the later
standard is pro-patent holder. The pro-patent holder and anti-patent holder nature
of these two standards is demonstrated by the fact that, in many opinions, the
plaintiff (patent holder) had argued to apply the post-March 1992 standard, while the
defendant (accused infringer) had argued to apply the earlier standard. Moreover,
some published opinions have actually stated that the post-March 1992 standard is
47
the narrower standard or the more stringent standard.
One telling scenario showing a patentee's preference for the narrow post-March
1992 standard is found in Upjohn Co. v. Mova PharmaceuticalCorp.48

The patent

owner, with the goal of influencing the court to apply the narrow post-March 1992
standard, repeatedly used the term patentability in its arguments regarding
materiality. 49 The term patentahilityinvokes the narrower and more stringent postMarch 1992 standard, not the earlier more-encompassing standard.

B. InconsistentApplication of the Pre-March1992 andPost-March 1992 Standards
The courts have not been consistent in following the March 16, 1992 change in
Rule 56. Generally, for patents prosecuted before March 1992, the courts have
followed the broader pre-March 1992 standard. But for patents filed and prosecuted
entirely after March 1992, some of the cases have cited (or cited and applied) the preMarch 1992 standard, while other cases have cited (or cited and applied) the post-

45 U.S. PAT.

& TRADEMARK

OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANIJAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 310 (8th ed., 5th rev. 2006) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also 35 C.F.R. § 202(c) (2006).
46 37 C.F.R. § 3.1.
47 Purdue Pharma v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1185, at 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), af/d,
410 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh'ggranted affd in part,vacated in part, 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (vacating the inequitable judgment); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., No. C
00-1030 SI, C 99-5464 SI, C 00-3291 SI, C 02-1426 SI, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16197, at *26-27 (N.D.
Cal. July 30, 2003); Jack Schwartz Shoes, Inc. v. Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 264 F. Supp. 2d 852, 859 (E.D. Mo. 2002),
rev'd, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004), remanded to 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27156 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12,
2007), affd, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1409 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 28, 2008) (affirming the finding that the
patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct); E. Am. Trio Prods. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97
F. Supp. 2d 395, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 667 (D.N.J. 2000), affd, 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
48 225 F.3d 1306, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
49 Id. at 1314.
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March 1992 standard. The court in Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioseienee, N. V 50
observed that after the USPTO changed its standard, the Federal Circuit had not
followed suit.51 Inconsistencies in the application of the two standards are detailed
at the end of this essay.
Two cases from 2005, Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility
Services,52 and Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 53 appeared to
have brought an end to this particular uncertainty of which standard would be
applied in the courts. As both opinions stated, the courts should give deference to the
USPTO's formulation of the standard of materiality at the time an application is
being prosecuted. However, the result was short-lived. Three cases from 2006,
Digital ControlInc. v. Charles Machine Works, 54 Agfa Corp. v. Creo Products,55 and
Ferring B. V v. Barr Laboratories,Inc., 56 held that the USPTO's adoption of the
narrower standard of materiality did not replace the reasonable examiner standard
found in the Federal Circuit's established case law, and that the narrower standard
57
of the post-March 1992 Rule 56 merely provides an additional test of materiality.

C Which Date Controls Choice ofLaw, the Date of the DeceptiveAct or
the FilingDate of the PatentApplication?
Does choice of administrative law that is applied, the pre-March 1992 Rule 56 or
the post-March 1992 Rule 56, depend on the filing date of the patent application,or
does it depend on the actual date of the allegedinequitable conduct?
A number of cases have found that the controlling date is the date of the event of
inequitable conduct. 58 CFMT Inc. v. Yieldup InternationalCorp.59 referred the lower
court's opinion of the correct standard (and did not confirm or dispute this opinion),
where the lower court "applied the pre-1992 standard for materiality, because the
relevant acts took place before 1992."60

D. A Third StandardofMateriality,the 'But For"Standard.

5o264 F. Supp. 2d 852.
51Id. at 859 n.33.
52 394 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
53 438 F.3d 1123, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
a4437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
a5451 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
56 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
57Digital Control,437 F.3d at 1316; Agfa Corp., 451 F.3d at 1373; FerringB. V, 437 F.3d at
1187 n.6.
58 See, e.g., In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
722 F.2d 1542, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983); CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
59349 F.3d 1333.
(3o
Id.
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A third standard, the "but for" standard, was articulated and properly rejected
in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic A VE, Inc.,61 where the court held that the test for
materiality was not whether the information would conclusively decide the issue of
6 2
patentability
The "but for" standard was also rejected in Sehreiber Foods, Inc. v.
Beatrice Cheese, Inc.,63 which characterized the "but for" standard as information a
jury found to be invalidating. 64 The U.S. district court hearing Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratorie6 5 characterized the third standard by writing that the
patent would have issued "but for" the misrepresentation or omission.6 6 The third
standard is not part of Rule 56.67 This lack of application of the "but for" standard
was noted by Harry F. Manbeck, Jr. in Evolution and Future of New Rule 56 and the
Duty of Candor:The Evolution andIssue of New Rule 56.68

E. Examples ofReferences That Are MaterialUnder the Pre-March 1992 Standard
but Are Not Material Under the Post-March 1992 Standard.
Guidance as to the difference between the more encompassing pre-March 1992
standard of materiality, and the narrower post-March 1992 standard, is provided by
the following cases. From the available cases, it is apparent that the degree of
guidance is somewhat sparse. The relative lack of guidance has inspired the routine
submission of huge IDSs, of up to 100 or more publications, where the goal of the
patent attorney is to ensure satisfaction of the broader standard of disclosure.
Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co. 69 provides a practical
definition of a reference that is likely material under the broad standard, but not
material under the narrow standard, stating that this type of reference is one that is
so close to the claimed invention that it induces the attorney handling the application
to amend the claims, before initial examination, to avoid reading directly on the
products.70 Ordinarily, one might view the reference as lacking in materiality,
because the reference is not material to the claims under review. However, the fact
that the reference was directly material to the claims as originally submitted renders
the reference material under the broader standard even after the amendment.

6;1194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d. 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(reversing infringement based on doctrine of equivalents and not addressing materiality of reference
to a U.S. application).
132Id. at

366.

92 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Wis. 2000), afl'd in part,rev'd in part, 31 F. App'x 727 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (affirming the lower court's finding of no inequitable conduct but reversing and remanding the
issue of infringement).
64 Id. at 873.
6 90 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000), affd in part, vacated in part, 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001), remanded to 90 F. Supp. 2d 522 (D.N.J. 2000) (denying defendant's summary judgment
motion for inequitable conduct based on nondisclosure of prior art, misconduct in prosecution, an
dmisrepresentations or omissions, and granting summary judgment for unresponsive statements to
the USPTO).
66 Id. at 548.
67 Manbeck, Jr., supra note 13, at 141.
68 Id. at 139-41.
(39759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
63

70 Id. at

14.
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Additional guidance as to what might be material under the broad standard, but
not material under the narrow standard, comes from Rhenalu v. Alcoa, Inc.71 Alcoa,
owner of U.S. Patent No. 5,213,639,72 failed to disclose Alcoa's "417 Process," a
process that improved damage tolerance of bare plate products. 73 The 417 Process
consists of a preheat step and a reheat step. 74 The court pointed out that these steps
are contrary to the teachings of the U.S. Patent No. 5,213,639, and held that the
417 Process cannot be considered material because it contains features that
contradict the claimed invention. 75 By suggesting that the process was contrary to
the claims, the court did not mean that the non-disclosed information (the 417
Process) rendered the claimed invention doubtful; it meant that the non-disclosed
information was so strikingly different from the claimed invention as to be irrelevant
to the claims.
Bayer AG v. Sony Electronics, Inc. 76 provides additional guidance of a reference
that might be material under the broad standard but not under the narrow
standard. 77 The court wrote that this reference could be one that discloses "the path
that leads an inventor to the invention."7 8 The opinion wrote that this type of
reference could have some degree of materiality, though not a high degree of
79
materiality.
Merck & Co. v. Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. 80 appears to identify a reference
(July 1996 Lunar News) that is material under the broad standard, but not material
under the narrow standard. 81 The court held that this document "has some degree of
materiality because it has relevance to the claimed invention, specifically the
recommended once-weekly dosage level ... [but it] does not render the claimed
82
invention invalid as either obvious or anticipated."
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.83 also seems to identify a reference

(Gardner Italian patent) that is material under the broad standard, but not under
the narrow standard. 84 That this reference was found to have some degree of
materiality was based, at least in part, on the fact that it was not disclosed during
the prosecution of the original patent, but was disclosed later on during a reissue
proceeding.8 5 The court noted that the lower court found that this, and other,
references "were material, but apparently did not find them to be particularly
86
material."
71 224

F. Supp. 2d 773, 805 (D. Del. 2000).

72 U.S. Patent No. 5,213,639 (filed Mar. 6, 1992).
73

Rhenalu, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 791.

74 Id. at 798.
75 Id. at 807.
76 229 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Del. 2002), afed, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25581 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5,

2003).
77 Id. at 362.
78 Id.

7 Id
80 288

F. Supp. 2d 601 (D. Del. 2003), rev'd, 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

81Id. at 633.
82 Id. at
83 845

632.

F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

84 Id. at
85 Id.
80)Id.

992.
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F. MATERIAL INFORMATION
Material information generally includes research publications, patents and
published patent applications, both U.S. and foreign, published abstracts and
proceedings from a conference, theses catalogued in a library, and grant applications
that are publicly available. Material information also includes documentation of a
sale or public use. These types of information are properly disclosed by way of an
IDS.
Other forms of information can be relevant to determining relevance of a
non-disclosed publication, for example, small entity status, ownership, inventorship,
and sources of federal funding. Although these forms of information are properly
submitted by other formats, for example, by the patent transmission form or by the
inventor's oath, the deceptive disclosure of small entity status or inventorship can
persuade the court to believe that non-disclosure of a publication also involved deceit.
8 7
Inventorship is only occasionally an issue in the Federal Circuit.
88
Dicta from Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex Computer & Management Corp.
provides an interesting guideline regarding materiality.
This case found that
materiality of omitted or concealed information is increased where the USPTO has no
8 9
way of securing information on its own.

1. MaterialityShown hy Citation in a Foreign CounterpartApplication or a Related
U.S. Application

a. Foreign CounterpartApplication
When a patent application is submitted to the USPTO, most applicants also
submit an identical international application ("PCT application").90
The PCT
application serves as a place-holder for a period of time that subsequently branches
off into regional applications or into applications into individual nations.9 1 Shortly
after the PCT application is filed, but before the application branches off into the
individual nations, an International Search Report is issued and mailed to the
inventor.9 2 For each reference, the Report indicates whether it is highly material or
merely provides background technical information.
In a number of cases from the Federal Circuit, materiality of a reference to a
U.S. application has been determined by its citation in the International Search
Report during prosecution of its counterpart foreign application. 93 Conversely, where
87 See, e.g., PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Fla. State Bd. of Educ. v. Am. Biosciences, Inc., 333 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

88 130
89 Id.

F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2001), vacated,351 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
at 1144.

90See 37 C.F.R. § 1.431 (2006).
91 Jd. § 1.496.
92 Id. § 1.413(c)(5).
93 Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002), rev'd on other
grounds, 339 F.3d. 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing the lower court's finding of infringement based
on the doctrine of equivalents but not addressing the issue of materiality regarding a reference);
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the International Search Report classifies a publication as merely disclosing
94
technical background, the Report can establish that the reference is non-material.
In addition to the Search Report, the PCT issues a written opinion as to the
patentability of the claims. Similarly, the patent offices in individual foreign
countries also issue written opinions on patentability. However, foreign legal
opinions that directly assess patentability are not likely to be material to any U.S.
application. The Federal Circuit in Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc. 95 and ATD Corp. v.
Lydall, Inc. 96 has cautioned that standards of patentability differ between foreign
patent offices and the USPTO 97 and that details of foreign prosecution, such as the
98
legal basis for rejection, are not an additional category of material information.

b. Where the Related ApplicationsAre Both US. Basic PatentApplications
D. 0. C C. Inc. v. Spintech Inc. 99 illustrates a situation where a reference (Knight
patent) was cited in a rejection of a first patent application, but where the applicant
failed to disclose the same reference to the examiner of a related second patent
application.100
The two patent applications were co-pending.
The examiner
(examiner Snay) cited the Knight patent against the first application, resulting in the
applicant's abandonment of that application. 10 1 However, the applicant failed to
disclose the Knight patent to the examiner (examiner Yuen) of the second patent
application. The second application was allowed and it issued. The court rendered
102
this allowed patent unenforceable because of failure to disclose Knight.

c. Re-ExaminationProceeding
Re-examination is a special procedure available to all patentees. 10 3 The reexamination proceeding can be initiated by a patentee interested in confirming the
strength of his or her patent. In a word, the issued patent is reviewed by a patent
examiner, where the examiner has the challenge of imposing rejections against the
patent, in view of the prior art. Where the patent survives the re-examination, the
patentee can expect to have a stronger patent that can survive scrutiny during any
possible litigation. A question that arises is whether a re-examination proceeding
can be used to disclose a prior art reference that had previously been concealed and

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); AEA Tech. v. Thomas
& Betts Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Spartan Tool, L.L.C., 223
F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Ohio 2002); ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
91TAP Pharm. Prods v. Owl Pharms., 419 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
9 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
96 159 F.3d 534.
97 Molins PLC,48 F.3d at 1180.
98 ATD Coirp., 159 F.3d at 547.
99 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
100 Id. at 1147.
101 Id. at 1154.
102

Id. at 1149.

103

See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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non-disclosed by the inventor during the prosecution of the original patent
application? The available case law indicates that the answer is no.
Where an issued patent is later subjected to a re-examination proceeding in the
USPTO, the patent examiner may cite references against the patent that had not
been disclosed during the prosecution of the original patent application. This
situation is evidence of materiality, especially if the rejection cannot be rebutted or
where the rejection is not withdrawn. For example, in Applera Corp. MDS v.
Micromass UK Ltd.,104 a reference (French) not disclosed during the original
prosecution of the patent was disclosed during a later re-examination proceeding of
the same patent. 10 5 Although the court refrained from holding that there was intent
to deceive, the early non-disclosure coupled with the later disclosure raised the issue
106
of deceptive intent.
In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,107 a material reference (Wagenseil) was withheld
with intent to deceive during the prosecution of a parent application, but was timely
submitted during a subsequent re-examination proceeding.108
Citation of the
reference during the re-examination did not cure the earlier intent to deceive.10 9 The
court found the manner in which the applicants had disclosed the reference during
re-examination-it had been disclosed in a buried form-was tantamount to not
disclosing it at all.110

d. Reissue Application
A reissue application is a format available to the patentee for changing the scope
of the claims of an issued patent.11 1 As with a re-examination proceeding, a reissue
patent application cannot be used to cure the earlier deceptive non-disclosure of a
material reference. The available case law reveals the following regarding reissue
applications.
Where the examiner of the reissue application finds the reference not material,
then the reference would also not be material to the prosecution of the original
patent, providing that claims of the same claim scope, as was held in Gen-Probe, Inc.
v. Vysis, Inc. 112 In short, while a reissue application cannot cure any previous intent
to deceive, where the examiner of the reissue application finds the reference in
question to be immaterial, this finding renders moot any question of the deceptive
113
non-disclosure during the prosecution of the original patent application.

104

204 F. Supp. 2d 724 (D. Del. 2002).

105

Id. at 759.

10c, Id. at 758.
107 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
10 Id. at 1190.
109 Id. at 1179.
110 Id. at 1183.
M See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (2006).
112 NO. 99-CV-2668 H (AJB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25020 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2002), vacated,
359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
113

Id. at *108.
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2. Non -Disclosureofa Sale or Public Use
Failure to disclose a sale or public use is a frequent issue arising during patent
litigation. 114 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey 15 provides a dramatic example where
inequitable conduct was found, rendering a patent unenforceable. 116 The nondisclosed sale had a high degree of materiality, because it was an invalidating sale.
Intent was inferred by the fact that the inventor had "enthusiastically touted sales
made after the critical date [the 1-year bar date]."117 The strong materiality of the
non-disclosed information, coupled with the weak evidence for intent, satisfied both
118
of the prongs needed for finding inequitable conduct.
For Your Ease Only, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp.119 illustrates an improper
disclosure of a sale of the invention. 120 The sale of the invention (activated carbon
cloth; ("ACC")) was disclosed to the USPTO, but the disclosure was improper. The
disclosure took the form of commentary in the patent's specification, which read: "A
commercial jewelry box (purchased from K-Mart Corporation) fitted with FM1-250
ACC (available from Calgon Carbon Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa.)."121 But the sale
was not additionally disclosed by way of an IDS, as it should have, and the patent
122
was rendered unenforceable.
The applicant has a duty to disclose any sales occurring one year before the
priority date or filing date. 123 This statutory one year period is sometimes called a
one-year "grace period." 124 However, for any sale occurring before the one-year grace
125
Reactive Metals &
period, it can be asked if the sale was truly material or not.
126
Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc. held that the inventor has no duty to disclose sales that
the inventor believes to be non -barringbecause the examiner is not in a position to

114 Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Monon Corp.
v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Jack Frost Labs., Inc. v. Physicians &
Nurses Mfg. Corp., Nos. 96-1114, 96-1430, 96-1543, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26138 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23,
1997); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995); LaBounty Mfg., Inc.
v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.

1989); Reactive Materials & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Argus Chem.

Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co, Inc., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co.,
740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Mentor Graphics v. Quickturn Design Sys., Nos. C 00-1030 SI, C 995464 SI, C 00-3291 SI, C 02-1426 SI, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16197 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003); Creo
Prods., Inc. v. Presstek, Inc., No. 99-525-GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6226 (D. Del. May 11, 2001).
115 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007), and 128 S. Ct. 391 (2007).
116 Id. at 1346.
117 Id.
118 Id.

119 No. 02 C 7345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7131 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2003).
120 Id. at "16.
121 U.S. Patent No. 6,412,628 col.4 (filed Mar. 22, 2000); For Your Ease Only, Inc., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7131, at *16 n.1.
22
1
For YourEase Only, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7131, at *16-17.
123 Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
124 Gemmy Indus. Corp. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The
Patent Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) permits a one-year grace period after the invention is first sold or
placed on sale, before the entitlement to a patent is barred.").
125
120

Reactive Metals &Alloys Cop., 769 F.2d at 1583.
Id.
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effectively challenge such an assertion. 127 Similarly, in Allied Colloids, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co.,1'28 the court held that failure to tell the examiner about a
sale cannot be deemed material because it is not inequitable conduct to omit telling
the patent examiner information that the applicant in good faith believes is not
material. 129 The sale in Allied Colloids was considered a close call by the court
because the sale had occurred only one week before the critical bar date. 130 Reactive
Materials and Allied Colloids contrast with the holdings of Argus Chemical Corp. v.
Fibre Glass-EvercoatCo., Inc.131and LifeScan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics,Inc.132
The Argus Chemical Corp. opinion observed that a sale had been made, where
the sale constituted a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102, but that the attorney had
submitted an amendment before initial examination, where the goal was to prevent
the item, as described in the claims, from being the same as the sold item. 133 In other
words, the elements in the device as sold matched, on a one-to-one basis, the
elements in the original claim. However, after the amendment, the components or
elements of the device as sold, no longer matched, on a one-to-one basis, the elements
in the claim. The court disapproved of the non-disclosure of the sale, writing that if
the applicant had considered the claims sufficiently narrow to be clear of the prior art
reference (the sale), then it was the responsibilityof the examiner, not the applicant,
to decide if the original claims had been amended sufficiently to be patentable over
13 4
the reference.
LifeScan concerned a patent having a priority date of August 13, 1986.135 The
opinion focused its attention on the non-disclosure of a newspaper article dated
February 1987, and a device (NovoCheck meter) displayed at a trade show in
September 1987.136 Despite the fact that these non-disclosed reference were dated
afterthe start of the one-year grace period (Aug. 13, 1985), and also afterthe patent's
priority date (Aug. 13, 1986), the court proceeded to review materiality and to assess
intent, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies,
138
Inc.,137 for the rule that a reference does not have to be "prior art" to be material.
To conclude, the application should disclose sales or public uses, especially
where the sale or public use took place at a time that was close to the critical bar
date. In view of the lack of bright line rules regarding whether or not an examiner is
in a position to evaluate a sale or public use, the applicant should consider disclosure
to be on the safe side.

Id.

12,7
128

64 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

Id. at 1577.
130 Id. at 1573.

129

131 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
132 103 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. Del. 2000), affd without opinion, 13 F. App'x 940 (2001).
1:3:3
Argus Chem.
134 Id. at 13.

Corp, 759 F.2d at 12.

135 Lifesean, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 382 n.2.
1I( Id. at

381.

869 F. Supp. 251, 255 (D. Del. 1994), affd in part without opinion, vacated in part without
opinion, 92 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
138 Lifescan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
137
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3. Non -DisclosureofPublicationsor LaboratoryData That Establish NonEnablement of the ClaimedInvention
Most researchers might consider relevant publications to include only those that
might serve as a basis for rejection for anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102) or obviousness
(35 U.S.C. § 103). However, publications and confidential laboratory data that call
into question the enablement of the claimed invention are also relevant, and must be
disclosed. Where a claim is rejected for non-enablement, the rejection is under
35 U.S.C. § 112.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc.13 9 provides a dramatic
example of a non-disclosed reference that questioned enablement of the claims. A
non-disclosed reference (JACS article) was found to be material because the reference
proved that a claim was non-enabled.1 40
The non-disclosed reference was a
publication, reporting the inventor's results and had been published on August 17,
1988.141 The U.S. patent application was filed shortly thereafter, on April 3, 1989.
Thus the JACS reference fell within the one-year grace period, and was not priorart
to the U.S. application.
The JACS reference disclosed that methoxymethyl ("MOM") and trimethylsilyl
("TMS") did not work as protecting groups. The court found that the JACS article
1 42
was material, found inequitable conduct, and rendered the patent unenforceable.
To review the time line, the inventor generated lab data showing that MOM and
TMS did not work, and then the inventor submitted a manuscript for publication in
JACS where the manuscript disclosed that MOM and TMS did not work. Later, the
applicant filed a patent application claiming use of MOM and TMS (things that the
inventor knew did not work), and then the JACS article was published. To conclude,
the case law demonstrates that the consequences of failing to disclose an afterarising reference can be severe.
Non-disclosure of references relating to non-enablement was also an issue in
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc.143 The inventor had failed to disclose the
Hsiao and Uehara references, references that raised questions of enablement of the
claimed invention. The court held that the Hsiao reference and the Uehara reference
were material.14 4 Although this non-disclosure, in itself, was held not enough to
establish intent to deceive the USPTO, the court invoked the applicant's general
145
pattern of non-credibility and rendered the inventor's patent unenforceable.
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience, N. V146 illustrates the situation where
laboratory data relating to enablement was held to be highly material. 147 The
1:39326
140
141

F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1231.

112 Id. at 1238 (explaining that no expert testified that a person of ordinary skill would know
how to make either TMS or MOM work as a protecting group).
143 128 F. App'x 767, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

M4Id. at 770 (holding that Housley did not knowingly withhold the material prior art
references).
145 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (D. Del. 2005), affd, 189 F.
App'x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
146 264 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mo. 2002), revd, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004), remanded to

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27156 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12, 2007), affd, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1409 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 28, 2008) (affirming the finding that the patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct).
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relevant patents claimed a biotechnology product used as an insecticide, where the
insecticide was claimed to be active with any plant and with all plants, e.g., tobacco,
cabbage, cotton, corn, and potatoes. Unfortunately, some time during the pendency
of the patent application, the inventor generated laboratory data demonstrating that
the claimed product did not work with cabbage or cotton. Even worse, the inventor
submitted
a Declaration
to
the
USPTO
stating,
"Itihe
test results
shown... demonstrate that [the invention] ... can generally be used to provide an
insect controlling amount ... in generally any plant .... I know of no test results
which are contrary to or inconsistent with the test results set forth above." 148 The
court found the non-disclosed test results with cabbage and cotton to be highly
material, that intent to deceive was established by the false nature of the declaration,
and held the patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct. 149 The take home lesson
is that where laboratory data that contradicts the claims are generated, the inventor
has a duty to disclose the contradictory data to the USPTO. From this opinion, it can
also be seen that any declarations submitted during the prosecution of a patent
application can act as lightning rods that can attract allegations of deceptive
150
intent.
In commentary in the Federal Register, the USPTO suggested that results from
invalid tests and failed experiments should be disclosed, writing that it is the patent
examiner who should make the determination after considering all the facts involved
1 52
in the particular case. 151 According to CFMT Inc. v. Yieldup InternationalCorp.,
test results that go somewhat beyond establishing enablement of a prototype are
generally not material and need not be disclosed, that is, test results demonstrating
that an embodiment fails to meet a certain commercially desired specification, or an
industry-wide standard, are not likely to be material. 153

4. Non -Disclosureof Patents,PatentApplications, and Office Actions (Examiner's
Rejections)
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.1 54 and the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
("MPEP") establish that where an applicant or assignee has filed two different patent
applications with similar or identical claims, the first application is material to the
second application. 155 The patent applications are relevant to each other because of
the prohibition against double patenting, that is, the situation where an inventor or
assignee owns two patents having identical claims, or two patents with different

Id. at 861.
Id. at 856.
119 Id. at 862.
150 See Jack Frost Labs. Inc. v. Physicians & Nurses Mfg. Corp., No. 92-CV-9264, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26138, at *10, *19 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) (concerning the issue of non-disclosed data
from the inventor's own laboratory, where the data established non-enablement of the claims).
151 Duty of Disclosure, supra note 15, at 2025-26.
152 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
153 Id. at 1342.
154 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
155 Id. at 1185; MPEP, supra note 45, § 2001.06(b); see also id. § 804 (stating "a claim in the
patent compared to a claim in the application" in an obvious-type double patenting).
147
148
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expiration dates having claims that are obvious in view of each other. 156 Where two
patent applications have the same owner or assignee, the two applications are
relevant to each other and must be disclosed to the examiners reviewing the two
cases, even if it is merely conceivable that there could be a rejection for double
patenting. 157 To satisfy the duty to disclose where there is the potential for a double
patenting rejection, it is important that the existence (identification by serial
number) of the co-pending applications be disclosed, more important that any Office
Actions (claim rejections) in the co-pending applications be disclosed, and most
important that any allowed elaimsin the co-pending applications be disclosed.158
Office actions from patent applications having identical claims, or claims of
similar scope, are material and must be disclosed. According to Dayeo Products,Inc.
v. Total Containment, Inc., 159 an office action containing rejections against a claim in
a first patent application is material to a second patent application that contains a
similar claim. 160 The applicant needs to use an IDS to submit the office action to the
examiner reviewing the second application. The Dayeo holding was applied in
McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 161 and the disputed
patent was rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct. 162 An inventor had filed
two patent applications with similar claims, where the first application was reviewed
by a first examiner (Examiner Trafton) and the second application was reviewed by a
second examiner (Examiner Lev).163 Examiner Lev rejected the claims in the second
patent in view of a Baker reference. 164 However, the inventor failed to disclose the
Baker reference to the first examiner, and also failed to disclose the office action
(Examiner Lev's rejection) to the first examiner. 165 Moreover, a week or so after
Examiner Lev imposed the rejection in view of Baker, the inventor informed
Examiner Trafton, in writing, that there was no relevant prior art.1 66 The Federal
Circuit held that the inventor intended to deceive the USPTO. 167 The Dayco rule for
disclosing office actions should be followed, where double patenting is a potential
issue. Dayeo must also be followed where the cancellation or amendment of any
claims had removed the potential for a double patenting rejection.
The above commentary concerns patents of overlapping claim scope that have
the same assignee. But what about patents of overlapping or identical claim scope
having different owners? Law firms are likely to encounter this situation, though it
is generally prevented by doing a conflict of interest analysis prior to accepting new
clients. This type of conflict can be prevented by conflict of interest checks, as

150 MPEP, supra note 45, § 804.
157 See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 912, 919, 923-26
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
158 See id.
159 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100 Id. at 1365.
101 487 F.3d 897.
1
Id. at 913-26.
163 Id. at 903-04.
104 Id. at 906.
165 Id.
166

Jd.

107 Id. at 909.
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reviewed by Lisa Dolak. 168 The Molins opinion refrained from commenting on this
type of fact pattern. However, in the Molins dissent, Judge Newman wrote that with
regard to the patent application that an entirely unrelated client happened to entrust
to the same lawyer an attorney's ethical obligations to each client are not erased
when possible conflict occurs. 169 In other words, Judge Newman believed that there
is not any duty to disclose a first patent application to an examiner of a second patent
application, where the first application and second application have entirely different
inventors.

5. CuringNon -Disclosureby Disclosure to an Examinerin a Related Patent
Applieation
Inventors often file multiple patent applications, where each patent application
has its own IDS. A problem that can arise, especially with a lengthy submission of
many publications, is submission of one particular publication in one IDS, but
inadvertent omission of that publication from the other IDS.
Boehringer Ingelbeim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Scbering-Plough Corp.170 discloses the
following holding. The court held that the non-disclosed reference (abstract of Collins
and Benfield) was not materialto the prosecution of a first patent, where the same
reference had been disclosed during the prosecution of a second, related patent, and
where the examiner of the second patent had considered the reference, but refrained
171
from using the reference in a rejection of the second patent application.
In Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball International,Inc., 172 two patent applications
were filed on the same day (October 30, 1969), where a material reference (Pearson)
had been disclosed in the first application but not in the second application. 173 A
successful argument for lack of materiality was based on the fact that the same
examiner (Stanley Witkowski) had examined both applications, 174 thus indicating the
examiner's awareness of the non-disclosed reference when reviewing the second
application. 175 A similar successful argument is found in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson,176 where the court wrote that the examiner was in charge of
both patent applications and had a duty of knowing their contents. 177 This type of
argument was also successfully used in Schnadig Corp. v. Collezione Europa
U.S.A.178
168 See generally Lisa A. Dolak, Conflict of Interest: Guidance for the Intellectual Property
Practitioner,39 IDEA 267, 267 (1999) (discussing "conflicts issues confronted by practitioners
representing clients in the procurement and enforcement of intellectual property rights ....
1(9 Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1192-93 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
170 106 F. Supp. 2d 667 (D.N.J. 2000), affd, 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
171Id. at 679-80.

172 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
173Id. at 1568.
17"Compare U.S. Patent No. 3,610,799 (filed Oct. 30, 1969) with U.S. Patent No. 3,610,806
(filed Oct. 30, 1969).
175 Allen Organ,839 F.2d at 1568.
176 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
177 Id.
at 1457.

178 No. 01-C-1697, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19083, at *23 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 2, 2002) (stating that this
argument by Schanadig raised a genuine issue of material fact and precluded the defendant's

[7:325 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

A similar fact pattern for establishing non-materiality, or at least attempting to
establish non-materiality, occurred in J.P.Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd.179 In the
J.P. Stevens opinion, it was argued that a reference was cumulative and thus nonmaterial because the examiner had once viewed the reference during the course the
1 80
prosecution of a non-related patent.
Lex Tex had failed to disclose a reference
(Weiss) to the examiner, during the prosecution of U.S. Patent No. 3,091,912.181 Lex
Tex argued that Weiss was not material because Weiss had already been before the
examiner during the same examiner's prosecution of the Weiss patent.
Unfortunately for Lex Tex, the court was not persuaded, and the court wrote that it
was only possible that the examiner had remembered the Weiss reference.18 2 The
court held that the disclosure in the non-related patent did not relieve the
1 83
materiality of the Weiss reference.
The following situation is similar to that where an application is being reviewed
by a first examiner, but the reference is disclosed only to a second examiner. If an
applicant fails to cite a reference to the examiner but does cite the reference to
another office within the USPTO, for example, to the Interference Branch of the
USPTO, the USPTO will not likely accept this as satisfying the duty to disclose. On
this question, the court in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoecht Marion Roussel, Inc.184 wrote that
the USPTO is not the equivalent of a small law firm office, in which notice to one
18 5
person may fairly be deemed notice to all.

6. MaterialityShown by LicensingAgreements and Submissions to Regulatory
Agencies
Materiality of a reference to a patent application can be shown, in the situation
where the reference in question is a patent, and where the applicant had acquired a
license to use the patent. In J.P. Stevens, the applicant had acquired a license to a
patent (Weiss patent) but had failed to disclose the Weiss patent during the
prosecution of its own application, where its own application led to U.S. Patent No.
3,091,912.186 The court held that the license agreement was conclusive evidence that
the applicant should have known of the materiality of Weiss, and rendered U.S.
Patent No. 3,091,912 unenforceable. 187 Thus, it is critical that patent attorneys and
licensing attorneys keep each other informed as to their patenting and licensing
activities. Similarly, materiality of a non-disclosed reference can be shown where the

motion for summary judgment on whether Schanadig's patent was unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct).
179 747 F.2d 1553, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
180 Id. at 1560.
1S U.S. Patent No. 3,091,912 (filed Apr. 19, 1957).
182 JP.Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1563.
183 Id. at 1567.
1S 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 2001), affd in part, vacated in part, 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
185 Id. at 139 (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Co., 798 F.2d 1392, 1399 n.7 (Fed. Cir.

1986)).
186

J.

187

Id.

Stovens, 747 F.2d at 1555-56.
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same reference had been submitted to a government regulatory agency, for example,
to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). In McKesson Information Solutions,
Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,188 materiality of a non-disclosed reference (Baker) was
found because the inventor had identified Baker in an FDA submission.18 9 Again, it
might be useful, in any company, for regulatory affairs personnel to keep their patent
department informed of references cited in FDA submissions.

7. Information on Related Interference Proceedings,Appeals, and LitigationsIs
Material
The applicant is required to notify the USPTO if an application is involved in a

litigation or in an interference. 190 Failure to disclose a related interference, an
appeal before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, or a related litigation,
192
is a frequent issue in lawsuits. 191 Marlow Industries,Inc. v. Igloo Products, Corp.,
concerned a patent owner's attempt to broaden a claim to encompass a picnic box,
where the picnic box was capable only of heating or that was capable only of
cooling. 193 The patent owner attempted to broaden the claims in this way, even
though a court, in a related litigation, held that the claim could cover only a picnic
box that had the ability to do both things (heating when it contained hot dogs and
cooling when it contained soda).194 The inventor failed to disclose the related
litigation and, because of this failure to disclose, the court rendered the patent

188
189

487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
See id. at 916.

190 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.178 (2006).
191 See, e.g., Marlow Indus., Inc. v. Igloo Prods. Corp., 65 F. App'x 313, 318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(emphasizing a district court's claim construction of patent may be material information); Newell
Window Furnishings, Inc. v. Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 15 F. App'x 836 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(determining whether litigation involving a design patent that claimed the designs in the patents at
issue was material); Li Second Family L.P. v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(involving a patentee's failure to include interference proceedings of another patent application to
the patent at issue); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1258
(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1071 (1998) (deciding whether prior litigation involving a
patent was material in prosecuting a reissue of that patent); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc. 707 F.2d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (regarding whether prior art references
discovered in previous litigation the patentee was involved in should have been disclosed);
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Feuling Advanced Techs., Inc, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 2003)
(stating the plaintiffs failure to divulge prior litigation involving the subject matter for a patent is
material to the PTO); Senior Indus. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., No 98-C-5842, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18995, at *45-46 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (involving whether articles used in an interference that
invalidated plaintiffs claims in another patent application was material); Affymetrix Inc. v. PE
Corp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concerning the issue whether disclosure of prior art in
an interference proceeding requires the Primary Examiner to consider such art); Jeneric/Pentron,
Inc. v. Dillon Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Conn. 2001) (concerning the materiality of not disclosing a
witness' testimony from a related patent); Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (arguing a clinical study
disclosed in interference proceedings does not satisfy the duty of disclosure in ex parte prosecution);
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1998), affd, 225
F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
192 65 F. App'x 313.
193 Id. at 315.
194 Id.
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unenforceable. 195 Moreover, the court held that submitting litigation documents
without providing the examiner with any roadmapping was like burying or hiding
196
the critical information.
Failure to disclose a related litigation or interference proceeding can be cured by
an examiner's independent discovery of the litigation. For example, in Amgen, Inc. v.
Hoecht Marion Roussel, Inc.,197 the examiner had jotted down a note on the file
198
wrapper of the application that he had reviewed the interference file.
To conclude, to properly ensure that the litigation had been considered by the
examiner, the applicant should disclose the litigation by way of an IDS, preferably
with roadmapping of the litigation.

8. Are Rumors or Incomplete Information Material? Duty To Investigate
According to Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc.199 an
applicant having incomplete information, such as hearsay information or rumors
regarding prior use or prior invention by another party, need not disclose this
incomplete information to the examiner. 200 The opinion disclosed that the inventors
had heard from colleagues that a competing researcher (Goff) had presented results
similar to theirs, but the record did not show that the inventors had learned any
additional details regarding Goffs work. 20 1 The court held that because the inventors
lacked crucial information, the incomplete knowledge that they did have was not
20 2
material and did not need to be disclosed.
In Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,203 an inventor (Dr. Doyle) was
aware that a competitor's device (ViolaWWW) possessed "a similar, if not identical,
capability" as the Doyle device. 20 4 However, the court held that the applicant had
possessed only incomplete information, that is, incomplete to the extent that one
could not compare the elements of the competitor's device with the elements in the
claims. 20 5 Although the court realized that one should not be able to cultivate
ignorance, citing Newell Window Furnishings,Inc. v. Springs Window Fashions

195 Id. at 320.
196 Id. at 315.
197 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 2001).
198 Id. at 139.
199 224 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
200 Id. at 1327.
201 Id. at 1322-23.
202Id. at 1327.
203 No. 99-C-0626, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20285 (N.D. I. Oct. 18, 2002), afed in part, vacated
in part,399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20
1 Id. at *18-20.
205 Id. at *22-24 (stating there was an issue of genuine fact if patentee had complete
information, and summary judgment could not be granted for the defendant).
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Divisions,Inc.,20 6 and FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Industries,Inc.,20 7 the court refrained
20 8
from holding that Dr. Doyle had possessed material information.
Similarly, in Harness International,Inc. v. Simplimatic Engineering Co.,20 9 the
inventor had heard of a prior art bottling machine with "corner mounting," but had
failed to disclose this bottling machine to the USPTO. 210 Although the inventor's own
device did use "corner mounting," the court held there was no duty to disclose
because of the following facts. 211 First, "corner mounting" was only one of several
features of the inventor's claimed device, second the inventor had never seen the
"corner mounting" of the prior art device, and third, the inventor did not know the
212
name of the manufacturer of the prior art device.
In contrast, in Brasseler, US.A.L, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Co.,213 the court held
that the applicant has a duty to investigate suggestions of prior art (a sale by the
2 14
inventor), and the court rendered the patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
The Brasseleropinion concerned a sale by the inventor occurring two weeks before
the critical bar date (before the start of the one-year grace period). The inventors
were aware of the sale and of the importance of the sale as an act that could
invalidate the claims. The inventors instructed the attorney to do a rushed filing. In
arriving at the holding of inequitable conduct, the court wrote that "inventors cannot
'empty-head' their own patent counsel of the sale." 215 Regarding the behavior of the
attorneys, the court found that they had notice that specific information existed (the
sale) and that their "studied refusal to timely investigate and disclose
216
information.., established that [the attorneys] ... acted with deceptive intent."
Similarly, in DaimlerChryslerAGv. FeulingAdvanced Technologies, Inc.,217 the
court held that there was a duty to investigate, even though the patent owner argued
that the information initially available to him (a photocopy) was too unreliable to
2
trigger a duty to disclose anything to the USPTO. 18
The consensus from the above cases is that rumors and incomplete information
may or may not trigger a duty to investigate. The duty to investigate hinges on the
degree of notice, or specificity of notice, at hand to the inventors and attorneys.

9. Non -Disclosureof a PriorityDate

206 No. 98-C-5003, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17273, at "109 (N.D. I1. Oct. 7, 1999), afrd in part,
rev'd inpart,vacatedin part 15 Fed. App'x. 836 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing the lower court's decision
of inequitable conduct, stating that the patentee did not intentionally scheme the PTO).
207 836 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
208 Eolas Teehs., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20285, at *24.
20) 819 F.2d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
210 Id. at 1107.
211
212

Id.
Id.

267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1382-83.
Id. at 1378 (citing Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp. 93 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1264
(S.D. Ga. 1999), aftfd, 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
216 Id. at 1383 (citing Brassekar, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-64).
217 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
218 Id. at 1066.
21:

214
215
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Patent applications always have a filing date, and sometimes have, in addition,
an earlier priority date. Priority is generally based on a U.S. Provisional patent
application. 2 19 When submitting a patent application, priority is properly disclosed
in the first paragraph of the specification, or by way of an amendment to the first
paragraph. Priority is directly related to patentability under both the pre-March
1992 and post-March 1992 standards of materiality.
Failure to disclose the correct priority date was an issue in Li Second Family
L.P. v. Toshiba Corp.,220 a case involving a family of related patent applications. For
example, in this family, U.S. Patent No. 4,916,513221 claimed a structure, while U.S.
Patent No. 4,946,800222 claimed methods for using that structure. 223 During the
prosecution of the structure patent, the examiner and the Board held that the claims
could not claim priority to earlier members in the patent family (earlier patents filed
in 1965 and 1968).224
Nevertheless, during the prosecution of the methods patent, the applicant again
claimed priority to the patents filed in 1965 and 1968.225 The court rendered the
methods patent unenforceable because the inventor (Li) repeatedly argued that the
226
claims were entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing dates.
A publication, advertisement, or brochure, suggesting the existence of prior art
patents with an earlier priority date can be material. Frazierv. Roessel Cine Photo
Tech, Inc. 227 concerned a failure to disclose an advertisement that put the applicant
on notice of a competing patent application. The court held that the inventor had a
duty to disclose the competitor's ad, and not to determine unilaterally that the ad
was not prior art.228 Note that the ad itself was not prior art, as it had had been
published afterthe inventor's filing date.

10. Non -DisclosureofAfter -ArisingPublications,Sales, and Public Use
Publications, sales, and public uses, arising after a patent's priority date can be
material, and therefore must be disclosed, even though after-arising references are
not properly classified "prior art."2 2 9 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene
Rorer, Ine.,230 the non-disclosed reference was a scientific article published by the
inventor after the patent's priority date, disclosing that the same invention as

See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2006).
231 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
221U.S. Patent No. 4,916,513 (filed Oct. 3, 1977).
222 U.S. Patent No. 4,946,800 (filed Aug. 6, 1973).
223 LiSecondFamily,231 F.3d at 1376.
219

220

224 Id.

Id.at 1377.
at 1378.
227 No. CV 99-10425-GAF, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19607, at *62-63 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2003),
afFd in part,rev'd in part,417 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court's inequitable
conduct determination based upon the failure to disclose the advertisement).
228 Id.at *98-99.
229 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003); GFI,
Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
230 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
225

226 Id.
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claimed in the patent was inoperative. 231 Because of the failure to disclose this
publication, the court held for inequitable conduct, and rendered the patent
unenforceable. 232 In GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp.,233 the non-disclosed material
included a viewing by the inventor of a model of a competitor's device (the Durling
sofa).234 The inventor saw the sofa about two months before the inventor's filing
date. 235

Thus, the sofa was not prior art, since it fell within the one-year grace

period. 236 However, the court rendered the inventor's patent unenforceable for
inequitable conduct, writing:
GFI argues that Durling cannot be material because it is not prior art.
That is not the law .... The district court made no finding as to priority

and we will not make that determination in the first instance on appeal. In
any case, it was incumbent on GFI to disclose the potential priority conflict
to the examiner and not to unilaterally make a determination that Durling
was not prior art.... It is axiomatic that "close cases should be resolved by
37
disclosure,not unilaterallyby applicant.'2

11. Sources of FederalFunding
Where an applicant's invention was conceived with support from the
U.S. government, or where an already-conceived invention was further developed
with government support, the applicant is required to include a federal support
clause in the specification. 238 The federal support clause takes this form, for
example, "STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR
DEVELOPMENT. This invention was made, in part, with U.S. government support
under National Institutes of Health grant no. ABCDEFG1234567. The government
may have certain rights in the invention."
In addition to disclosing the above information to the USPTO, the applicant
needs to conform with certain reporting requirements.
These reporting
requirements, as it applies to the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"),239 are
240
outlined below. Campbell PlasticsEngineering& Manufacturing,Inc. v. Brownlee

231Id. at 1231.
232 Id. at 1238-39.
233 265 F.3d 1268.
231 Id. at 1272.
235Id.
236Id. at 1274.
237Id.(emphasis added)

(quoting LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958
F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
238 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2006).
239 A "20-20" View of Invention Reporting to the National Institutes of Health, NIH Guide for
Grants and Contracts in NIH, NIH GUIDE, vol. 24, No. 33, September 22, 1995,
http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/guide/noticefiles/not95003.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) [hereinafter
NIH]; see also 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(4) (stating the following must be included in the application,
"This invention was made with government support under (identify the contract) awarded by
(identify the Federal agency). The government has certain rights in the invention.").
240 389 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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dramatically shows the consequences of failing to adhere to the reporting
241
requirements.
The NIH provides funding via the Small Business Innovation Research ("SBIR")
and Small Business Technology Transfer ("STTR") programs. Inventions made with
this funding need to be reported to the NIH. 242 Where an invention was conceived
under non-government funding, but is later reduced to practice under government
243
funding, the invention also needs to be reported to the U.S. government.
NIH must be notified within two months of the inventor's initial report to the
organization that had received the NIH grant. 244 Notification to the NIH needs to be
sent to the Extramural Invention Reporting and Technology Resources Branch,
Office of Policy for Extramural Research Administration ("OPERA"), in Bethesda,
Maryland. 245 If the inventor fails to adhere to these requirements the U.S.
246
government may obtain title to the invention.
In Campbell Plasties Engineering & Manufacturing, Campbell Plastics had
developed, for the U.S. Army, a protective mask. 247 After the invention of this mask,
Campbell submitted a patent application to the USPTO, now U.S. Patent No.
5,895,537.248 Although Campbell had disclosed all technical aspects of the invention
to the Army during the development phase, Campbell had failed to point out that the
249
disclosure contained something new, i.e., that an invention was present.
Moreover, in filling out the required form (DD Form 882), Campbell had indicated
"no invention" and "none." 250 The result was that Campbell lost its patent to the
U.S. Government. 251 Failure to disclose a source of federal funding was also an issue
252
in Trinity Industries,Inc. v. Road Systems, Inc.

12. Cumulative References
Where a reference is held to be a cumulative reference, the reference is a
non-material reference, and need not be disclosed. 253 A reference is materialwhen it
discloses more claim elements than other documents already disclosed. But the
reference is merely cumulative and not materialif it does not disclose any additional

241 Id.at

1249.
See NIH, supra note 239.
213 Rutgers v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 764, 773 (Fed. Cl. 1998).
244 NIH, supra note 239.
242

24 5 Id.
216Id.

247Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Id.at 1246.
Id. at 1244-45.
250Id.
251 Id.at 1246, 1249-50.
252 235 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
253 See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1995); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm, 958 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
No. 97-421-JJF, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11422, at *10 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2001), qfld in part, rev'din
part,323 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's judgment of infringement due to
248
249

improper claim construction).
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claim elements. In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical,Inc.,254 a

prior art reference (Baker) was held to be material, and not cumulative, because it
255
was more explicit and clear than other references that were before the examiner.
In detail, the Baker reference provided over eleven columns of writing relevant to the
claims, whereas another reference (Pejas) contained only two columns of relevant
writing.
Eaton Corp.. v. Rockwell InternationalCorp.256 concerned the failure to disclose

a patent (Vukovich patent) to the USPTO. The court pointed out that while the
Vukovich patent disclosed four of the ten features found in the applicant's patent, the
Shulze patent, which had been disclosed to the USPTO, discloses these same four
features, but that Shulze also discloses a fifth feature in common with the applicant's
257

claim.

The court held that Vukovich was cumulative, and that Shulze was not

cumulative. 258
Further commentary on what distinguishes non-cumulative
references from cumulative references is available from LifeScan, Inc. v. Home
Diagnostics,Inc. 259 This case held that a non-disclosed reference (NovoCheck meter
device) was not material, because a patent that had been properly submitted,
disclosed 'the same thing' as the NovoCheck meter,"260 and that another nondisclosed reference (newspaper article) was not material, because it merely concerned
"financial and investment aspects"

261

of a prior art device.

G. INTENT TO DECEIVE

While materiality is the first prong for a finding of inequitable conduct, intent is
the second prong. Intent to deceive can be shown as direct evidence of deliberate
planning (i.e., a smoking gun), but more usually, intent to deceive is inferred from a
pattern of non-disclosures.

1. Intent Shown by DirectEvidence ofDeception
Ashland Products, Inc. v. Truth Hardware Corp.262 provides a situation where

there was direct evidence of intent to deceive the USPTO, and where there was no
need to infer intent. 263 Truth Hardware filed a patent application and provided its
attorney with a "window operator." The inventor possessed a window operator made
by a competitor (Roto Frank/Interlock Operator), where the window operator
254 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007), affg No. S-02-2669 FCD KJM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76517
(E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006).

255

Id. at 909.

256

2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11422.
Id. at *50-51.

2

57

258

Id. at *53.

259

103 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (D. Del. 2000), affd, 13 F. App'x 940 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2060Id.

Id.
No. 99-C-5786, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11362 (N.D. 111. July 1, 2003) dismissed, 85 F. App'x
195 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
261

2 2

2 3 Id. at

*28.
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contained all of the elements of Truth Hardware's submitted claim. This meant that
Truth's claim was likely rendered invalid by the competitor's device. However, Truth
supplied its attorney with the Roto Frank/Interlock Operator but removed part of the
operator (plastic packer), resulting in a device of less relevance to the submitted
claims. Because Truth was not truthful to its attorney or to the USPTO, the court
264
rendered its patent unenforceable.
Another more or less direct showing of intent to deceive comes from For Your
Ease Only, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp.265

The non-disclosed

reference was a

brochure (CCI Brochure), and intent to deceive the USPTO was demonstrated as
follows. The inventor knew that the CCI Brochure was material information. In
preparing the patent application, the inventor had copied information almost
verbatim from a confidential document (Tromposch report). This report referred
repeatedly to the CCI Brochure. However, in drafting the patent application, the
266
inventor had selectively deleted any mention of the CCI Brochure.

2. Intent to Deceive Shown by RepeatedExposures to a Non -DisclosedReference
Repeated exposure to a non-disclosed material reference, or other facts and
circumstances surrounding the applicant's conduct, can be used to show intent to
deceive the USPTO. Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn 267 held that indirect evidence for
intent should be accepted by the courts because the "duty of candor owed the PTO
being uncompromising, it would deal a deathblow to that duty if direct proof of
wrongful intent were required."268
Elk Corp. v. GAF Buiding Materials Corp.269 illustrates the situation where

repeated exposure was shown to establish intent to deceive the USPTO. 270 Repeated
exposure took a number of forms, for example, a letter and a memo. The court also
observed that it was the standard practice of the patent attorney to disclose all of the
prior art cited in a search report. 271 However, the attorney failed to disclose two
references (Bettoli and Giles patents) in the search report. The letter revealed that
the applicants knew that the claimed invention was very similar to the Bettoli patent
shingle. The memo revealed that the Giles patent was of "special interest." The
272
court inferred intent to deceive and the patent was rendered unenforceable.
National Diamond Syndicate, Inc. v. Flanders Diamond USA., Inc.2 73 also

shows the fact-pattern where there was no explicit evidence of scheming, but where
documentation of a repeated exposure was used to infer intent. 274 The repeated
exposures to the non-disclosed prior art took the form of testimony, a publication
264

Id. at *29.

265No. 02-C-7345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21901, at *11-12 (N.D. 11. Dec. 4, 2003).
266

Id. at *20.

719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1151 (emphasis added).
269 168 F.3d 28 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
267

268 Id.at

270 Id. at
271Id. at
272 Id.

29.
32.

273

67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (N.D. 11. 2003).

274

Id. at 1675.
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authored by the inventor, and two letters. Because the evidence demonstrated that
the inventor had repeated exposures to the prior art (gems with the Petar Cut
275
design), the court held that the non-disclosure was with deceptive intent.
Harris Corp. v. Ericsson, Inc. 276 illustrates a situation where documentation of a
face-to-face meeting between an inventor and the author (Van Uffelen) of a nondisclosed reference (1975 Van Uffelen article) was used to help establish intent of the
7

2
inventor to deceive the USPTO. Y
Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight278

illustrates

the

fact-pattern

where

documentation of repeated awareness of a non-disclosed reference (Stolar patent)
supported a finding of intent. 27 9 This documentation took several forms, for example,
a memo from the in-house legal department stating that Stolar was dangerous prior
art, a letter from former counsel recommending that Stolar be disclosed to the
USPTO. Deceptive intent was also inferred by the fact that the inventor had
changed legal counsel, and hired new counsel that was unfamiliar with the Stolar
prior art. Changing of legal counsel was also used to support a finding of deceptive
intent in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc. 280 In short, the
Federal Circuit believed that the inventor had hired new counsel because the new
281
counsel was unaware of the importance of the non-disclosed reference.
In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 28 2 deceptive intent was inferred because the
inventor had repeatedly disclosed a reference (Wagenseil) over the course of
thirteen years to the foreign patent office, but failed to disclose the reference to the
USPTO. 28 3

In Baxter International,Inc. v. MeGaw, Inc., 28 4 deceptive intent was also

inferred by repeated exposure of the inventor to a non-disclosed reference (Borla
device), where the repeated exposure took the form of a company memo and by
28
documentation of a visit by the inventor to the manufacturer of the Borla device.

5

In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 28 6 intent to deceive was
inferred because a material reference (1997 book on implants) was described or cited
in a draft of the patent application, but was subsequently deleted from the patent
application as actually filed with the USPTO. 287 A similar situation is disclosed in
28 9
288
albeit with a different result.
Bayer AG v. Sony Electronics,Inc.,

275

Id. at 1673.

194 F. Supp. 2d 533 (N.D. Tex. 2002), rev'd in part on other grounds, 417 F.3d 1241 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's judgment of infringement due to improper claim
construction).
277 Id. at 548.
278 Nos. 973275 (MLC), 98-4376 (MLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22600 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2002),
affd 78 F. App'x 113 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
27) Id. at *29.
280 No. 95C8833 (RPP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13706, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2002).
281 Id. at "12.
282 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
28
3 Id. at 1181-82.
28 149 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
276

285Id. at 1330.
28( 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
287 Id. at 1072.
288 229 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Del. 2002),
28) Id. at 364 (concluding that the

affd, 83 F. App'x 334 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
deletion of references contained in the draft was not
persuasive that there was an intent to deceive).
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In IDEC Pharmaceuticals v. Corixa Corp.290 intent to deceive was based on

several suspicious acts, namely on the fact that the relevant non-disclosed references
(five abstracts) were authored by the applicants, by listing a relevant citation in the
text of the patent but burying it in a list of ninety-four references (and not including
it in the IDS), and by redacting the title of one of the cited articles (a title that
revealed the publication's contents).291 The consequence was that the court rendered
292
the patents unenforceable.
In another case, In re Jerabek,293 evidence of repeated exposure to a nondisclosed reference took the form of a letter to a foreign counsel regarding
prosecution of the Japanese counterpart, stating that the reference (Sattler) was the
most pertinent prior art.294
295

The court held that the inventor had acted with

deceptive intent.
However, Merck v. Teva Pharmaceutical2 96 illustrates the fact-pattern where
only one exposure to a non-disclosed reference was held not enough to sustain any
finding of intent. 297 This single exposure took the form of a twelve-page memo given
to the inventor, where the non-disclosed reference (a single page) was stapled to the
back of the memo. 298

In other words, Merck demonstrates the situation where

deceptive intent was an issue, but where the court refrained from finding deceptive
299
intent.

3. Intent To Deceive Inferredfrom the Totality of the Circumstanceq
Deceptive acts, one step removed from patent examination activities, or even
totally remote from the patent prosecution process, can also be used to infer intent to
deceive the USPTO. In Jack Frost Laboratories, Inc. v. Physicians & Nurses
Manufacturing Corp.,300 a finding of inequitable conduct for failing to disclose a
material reference was inferred from a number of acts having no relevance to
proceedings before the USPTO. 30 1 These deceptive acts included those of the
30 2
inventor's wife, that is, the inventor's wife's decisions to destroy company records.
In DaimlerChryslerAG v. Feuling Advanced Technologies, Inc.,30 3 an
inappropriate clause in a written agreement (a settlement agreement) prepared by
the patent owner turned the tide against the patent owner (Feuling), and persuaded
290

No. 01-1637-IEG (RBB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18465 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2003).
*60, *62.

291 Id.at
292

Id. at *73.

293 789 F.2d 886
294 Id.at 891.
295Id.
296 288 F. Supp.

(Fed. Cir. 1986).

2d 601 (D. Del. 2003), rev'don other grounds, 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(finding erroneous the district court's claim construction).
297

Id. at 633.

298 Id.
299 Id.

300 Nos. 961114, 961430, 961543, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26138 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 1997),
a/fg901 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
301Id. at *18-19.
302 Jack FrostLabs., 901 F. Supp. at 727.
303 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
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the court to infer deceptive intent from Feuling's non-disclosures before the
USPTO.03 4 The settlement agreement was not relevant to any proceedings before the
30
USPTO. 5

4. Abstracts and ForeignLanguageReferences
Submission of an abstract, a foreign language publication, or a partial
translation supplied with a foreign language publication can raise the issue of failure
to comply with the duty to disclose, and can lead to a holding of inequitable conduct.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratorie30 6 provides the following
lesson regarding abstracts. Where an abstraet is published and where a laterpublished complete report is published, and where the two references reach different
conclusions or have conflicting results, both references are still material and should
be disclosed. But where the conclusions of both documents are the same, they would
be considered to be cumulative, thus relieving the duty to disclose both documents.
Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.307 provides
guidance regarding foreign language references.
Non-English references are
sometimes submitted in an IDS. Submission of a non-English reference, without an
308
English translation, cannot in itself result in a finding of intent to deceive.
Moreover, submission of a non-English reference along with a partial English
translation, will not necessarily suggest any intent to deceive. 30 9 However, intent to
deceive was found because the partial translation focused on less material portions,
leaving the examiner with the false impression that the examiner did not need to
conduct any further translation. 310
The untranslated portion of the Japanese
reference contained a more complete combination of the elements claimed in the
inventor's patent, demonstrating a high degree of materiality of this reference.
Deceptive intent was also found because the inventor was fluent in Japanese, and
311
also because the inventor had immense experience in prosecuting patents.
Key Pharmaceuticalsv. Hereon Laboratories Corp.312 illustrates the situation
where submitting an abstract (Japanese application), but not the entire document,
raised an issue of failure to comply with the duty to disclose. Although the court
eventually held that the complete Japanese application was not material, the case
demonstrates that submitting only an abstract can raise issues. 313 Similarly, in LNP
Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc. 3 14 submission of a partial
translation of a foreign reference (Japanese Patent Publication No. 56-5714) and

Id. at 1063.
See id. (describing the terms of the settlement agreement).
'306 90 F. Supp. 2d 522 (D.N.J. 2000), affdinpart,rev'din part,246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
304
305

(affirming the lower court's denial of summary judgment for inequitable conduct).
307 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
'308 Id.

at 1378.

301)Id.

(noting that "the duty in this case is the duty of candor, not a duty of translation").

310

Id. at 1377.

311

Id. at 1376.
161 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 719.
275 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

312
313
314
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failure to submit the complete translation raised issues of non-disclosure.3 15 To avoid
issues, it is best to submit complete translations. Note that the USPTO may provide
316
free translation under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, under ExParteJones.

5. Non -Disclosureofan Assignee
Although the identity of an assignee is not disclosed by way of an IDS, failure to
properly identify an assignee can help establish a pattern of deceit, where the issue is
deceptive non-disclosure of material information. Ownership can have direct bearing
on patentability, as the nature of the ownership can influence rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and for double patenting. Non-disclosure of an assignee (Columbia
University) was an issue in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 17 The
opinion found that the non-disclosure of ownership had reinforced the pattern of
concealment and possible deception. 318 The outcome was a holding of inequitable
3 19
conduct.

6. ImproperDisclosure of Small Entity Status
Improper disclosure of small entity status tends to arise when a small entity
assigns or licenses a patent to a large entity, and where the small entity fails to
change its status from small entity to large entity.3 20 Where assignment or licensing
to a large entity has occurred, it is no longer proper to claim small entity status in
21
paying fees to the USPTO.
Improper assertion of small entity status was an issue where the court reviewed
an applicant's failure to disclose prior art publications. In DaimlerChryslerAG v.
FeulingAdvanced Technologies, Inc.,322 the court found that inappropriate, repeated
assertions of small entity status tipped the scales against the applicant, and the
patent was rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct.3 23 The opinion observed
that the inventor (James Feuling) had improperly claimed small entity status and
had paid reduced fees at least seven times.3 24 The opinion added that if the matter of
small entity status had been the only issue, the court would not have rendered a
holding of unenforceability, because of the fact that failure to pay appropriate fees
does not directly relate to patentability.3 25 In view of the variety of forms taken by
the inventor's deceptive behaviors, it is clear that Mr. Feuling was fooling. Improper
assertion of small entity status was also an issue in Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex
Id. at 1360.
'316 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1206, 1208-09 (B.P.A.I. 2001).
317 No. 01-148-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22411 (D. Del. Dec. 4, 2003).
315

318 Id. at *46.
3'19Id.

at *47.

320See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2) (2006).

321I-d. § 1.27(a)(2)(i).
322 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
323 Id. at 1067.

324 Id. at 1061.
325Id. at 1062.
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Computer & Management Corp.,3 26 where the court pointed out that Lex (a large
entity) had repeatedly claimed small entity status, saving $25,000 in maintenance
fees over the past ten years. 327 Because of failure to establish intent, the Federal
3 28
Circuit refrained from a holding of inequitable conduct.

7. Burying and Intent To Deceive
Burying is a frequent issue relating to the duty to disclose. "Burying" refers to
the submission of a highly relevant prior art reference by way of an IDS, where the
IDS is also used to submit dozens or hundreds of less relevant references. In Molins
PLC v. Textron, Inc.,329 a reference (Wagenseil) was disclosed in an IDS, but the
reference was provided in an eleven page list of ninety-four references.3 30 The court
characterized the buried manner by which the Wagenseil references were disclosed
33 1
as tantamount to failing to disclose them at all.
In Cordis, Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,332 submission of a material reference
along with sixty other references was considered burying. 333 The holding hinged on
deceptive intent to submit a reference in a parent patent application. 334 Even though
the reference was properly disclosed in an IDS submitted during the prosecution of
the daughterpatent application, it was submitted in buried form. Because of failure
to submit the reference in the parent application, and because submission in the
daughter application was in a buried form, the court rendered both patents
5
unenforceable3
IDEC Pharmaceuticalsv. Corixa Corp.3 36 characterized burying as disclosure of
a material reference in a list of nearly 100 references. 337 The holding of inequitable
conduct was based on disclosure by an improper method (in the specification rather
than in an IDS) and on deceptive elimination of the descriptive title of the
reference.338 Thus, inequitable conduct was held because of three factors: burying,
33 9
improper disclosure of the reference, and deception regarding the title.
Rohi & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co.340 concerned the submission of
information during an interview with the examiner. The information, which could
also have been submitted by way of an IDS, consisted of confidential laboratory data,
where the data raised doubts as to the effectiveness of the claimed invention, an

326

351 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

327
'328

Id. at 1153.

3

Id. at 1150.
48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

33

Id. at 1182-83.

:31 Id.
332

194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002) rev'don other grounds, 339 F.3d. 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Id. at 368.
3: Id.
3

Id.
No. 011637IEG (RBB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18465 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2003).
37 Id. at *62.
338 Id. at *63.
33
Id. at *70-71.
340 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
335
336
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herbicide. 341 The information took the form of a 3,771 page mountain of largely
irrelevant laboratory results. 342 The court rendered the patent invalid on the basis of
343
burying.
At its extreme, burying can take the form of including the most relevant prior
art reference in large numbers of unrelated documents in "citation dumps." Actual
344
citation dumps include those that list 700 items or nearly 3,000 items.

At an earlier time, the USPTO required the IDS to include a concise statement
of relevance of each reference, that is, "roadmapping. 345 This earlier policy helped
prevent burying, but the policy was discontinued. More recently, the USPTO
346
proposed reviving this policy, but the proposal was not adopted.
And still more recently, in July 2006, the USPTO again proposed reviving the
policy of requiring roadmapping. 347 However, as shown by published comments from
patent practitioners published in the Federal Register, the responses from the public
were unanimous in their opposition to the requirement for roadmapping.

8. Evidence ofIgnorance Can Cure Intent; Evidence of Educationor Awareness Can
Show Intent
When faced with questions of intent to deceive the USPTO, an inventor
sometimes argues he is not familiar with patent law, is an absent-minded professor
who always left the nuts and bolts to his lawyers, is a man of science who has no time
for legalese, or is a foreigner unfamiliar with U.S. patent law. 348 In McGinley v.
Franklin Sports, Inc.,349 an argument for lack of intent to deceive took the form of an
350
argument that the attorney did not understand the invention.
Lora] Fairchild,Inc. v Victor Co. of Japan,Ltd.351 discloses a unique situation
where ignorance was used to avoid a finding of intent to deceive.3

52

In the legal

341Id.

at 1559.
1564.
343 Id. at 1572.
'32Id. at

344 Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goods, 63 Fed. Reg.53,498 (Oct.5, 1998); 1215
Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 87 (Oct. 27, 1998).
345Pall Corp. v. PTI Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2006).
346 Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goods, 63 Fed. Reg. at 53,498; Changes To
Implement the Patent Business Goods, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,772 (Oct. 4, 1999); Changes To Implement
the Patent Business Goods, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,604 (Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3,

5, 10).
317
Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters,
71 Fed. Reg. 38,808-10 (July 10, 2006); United States Patent and Trademark Office, Comments on
Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/ids.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
348Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy
Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1987); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Feuling Advanced Techs., Inc.,
276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Jack Schwartz Shoes, Inc. v. Skechers, U.S.A., Inc., 233
F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
349 92 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2000), affd inpart, rev'd in part, 262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.

2001).

350 ITd. at 1222.
351 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
352 Id. at 1948.

1943 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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department of Loral Fairchild Corp., a first attorney prosecuted a first application
while a second attorney prosecuted a second application. 353 The claims of both
applications covered the same technology. 354 A material reference (Erb) was cited by
the examiner in the divisional application. 355 However the attorney failed to notify
the second attorney of this reference. 356 During litigation, the second attorney was
accused of deceptive intent due to the non-disclosure of the Erb reference in the
358
second application. 357 However, the court held for lack of intent, due to ignorance.
From the available case law, In re Harita359 contains the largest number of
arguments for lack of intent to deceive, due to ignorance. 360
The inventor
successfully avoided a finding of intent by arguing ignorance due to the fact that he
was Japanese, Japanese patent law does not have a duty to disclose after a patent
application has been filed, and, hence, he was not aware of the U.S. requirement for
duty to disclose after the patent application is filed.36 1 Moreover, once the inventor
became aware of the non-disclosed reference, he properly disclosed it by way of a
reissue patent application, a format generally not accepted for curing an earlier
deceptive non-disclosure.36 2 The result was that the inventor successfully avoided a
363
finding of inequitable conduct.
Conversely, heightened competence can establish intent to deceive.
For
example, in DaimlerChryslerAG v. FeulingAdvanced Technologies, Inc., 36 4 intent to
deceive was demonstrated by the existence of the inventor's letters containing savvy
discussions of claim language and recommendations for claim strategy.3 6 5 In Ulead
Systems, Inc. v. Lex Computer & Management Corp.,3 66 intent was demonstrated by
evidence that the attorney did, in fact, understand that small entity fees needed to be
properly disclosed, where the evidence took the form of the fact that the attorney had
3 67
attended a lecture in patenting procedure that covered small entity fees.
Similarly, in Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,3 68 evidence for deceptive intent took the
3 69
form of documentation that the patent agent was a seasoned patent practitioner.
Consistently, Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works3 70 characterized the
applicant as an extremely experienced inventor who had applied for numerous
371
patents and was aware of the duty of candor.

'353 Id.
354 Id.

at 1947.
at 1946.

'35 Id. at
357 Id. at
358 Id.

1947.
1946.

'359 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir.
360 Id. at 806-07.
361

1988).

Id.

'362 Id.

at 807.
Id. at 809.
364 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
'365 Id.
at 1062, 1067.
366 130 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2001), vacated,351 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
367 Id. at 1145.
368 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
369 Id. at 1181-82.
370 437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
371 Id. at 1319-20.
363
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To conclude, the Federal Circuit readily infers deceptive intent, in the absence of
a smoking gun, where it can be shown that the inventor or attorney has a heightened
degree of competence or understanding or experience regarding the duty to disclose.

9. Can Intent To Deceive Be Cured Where an ExaminerFinds a Non-Disclosed
Reference on Her Own?
If an applicant fails to disclose a material reference with intent to deceive, and if
an examiner independently finds the reference, will the examiner's independent
finding cure the finding of intent? The Federal Circuit has been inconsistent on this
matter. In A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,3 2 and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc.,3 73 an examiner's independent finding did not cure
intent,374 while in Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,3 75 an examiner's independent finding
did cure intent. 37 6 An early case, Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic
Applianees, Inc., 377 addressed this situation but came to no conclusion on the
378
matter.
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 37 9 the lower court applied the rule of
A.B. Dick 380 while the Federal Circuit applied the rule from Mo]ins, 381 observing that
Molins was a more recent authority. 3

2

In their article, William C. Rooklidge and

Matthew F. Weil observed that, with regard to A.B. Dick, the Federal Circuit has
turned its back on this case and has chosen to ignore it.33
In A.B. Dick, an applicant failed to disclose a reference (Magarvey) with
deceptive intent, but the examiner later found Magarvey on his own, and rejected
fourteen of the claims (in view of Magarvey), claims that the examiner had previously
found allowable. 38 4 The court held that an examiner's independent discovery of a
38 5
non-disclosed reference will not cure intent.
In Molins, the Federal Circuit held that if there was non-disclosure of a
reference (Lemelson) with deceptive intent, deceptive intent could be cured where the

798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
374 A.B. Dick Co., 798 F.2d at 1397; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d at 1241.
375 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
372

373 326

'376Id.

at 1189.

377 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
378

Id. at 1383-84.

'379 87

F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding
inequitable conduct), revgNos. CV 90-93 MRP, CV 90-4823 MRP, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 729 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 4, 1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997) (remanding the case back to the Federal Circuit to
further consider its infringement analysis in light of the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) decision regarding the doctrine of equivalents).
380Litton SyS., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 729, at *111.
'81 Litton Sys., 87 F.3d at 1571.
382 Id. at 1578 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Stare Un-Decisi: The Sometimes Rough
Treatment ofPrecedent in FederalCircuitDecision-Making, 80 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 791,
807 (1998).
384 A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
385Id.
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examiner later independently found the reference.3 8 6 Similarly, Sash Controls, Inc.
v. Talon, L.L.C s held that where an examiner independently finds a non-disclosed
3 88
reference, it is not to be considered as withheld from the USPTO.
But note the dissent in Molins. The dissent observed that in Scripps Clinic &
Research Fund v. Genentech, Inc.,38 9 the non-disclosed reference (Meyer) was held to
be non-material, and that the holding in Scripps regarding this matter was not a
3
holding, but only dicta.

90

Litton Systems concerned non-disclosure of a reference (Laznovsky article).391
The lower court described a smoking gun type of intent to deceive.3 92 The smoking
gun intent took the form of the applicant's disclosure of the 1977 Veeco catalogue, but
where two pages were missing from the catalogue, where the missing pages appeared
as "ghosts" of the missing pages, and where these missing pages described the nondisclosed reference.3 93
The examiner independently found the non-disclosed
reference.3 94 The lower court held that the examiner's finding failed to cure the
intent, citing A.B. Dick.3 95 On the other hand, the upper court cited Molins as the
more recent law and held that the examiner's finding did indeed cure the deceptive
3 96
intent.
The Federal Circuit in Bristol-Myers Squibb concerned the unique situation
where the examiner had discovered the non-disclosedreferences on her own but had
not considered the references. 397
In view of the fact that the examiner had
independently discovered the reference, the rule of Molins would suggest that the
examiner's discovery would cure the intent to deceive. However, the record (the file
history) demonstrated that the examiner had failed to actually read the reference.
The court held for inequitable conduct for failure to disclose, and rendered the patent
unenforceable. 398

The author suggests that the Federal Circuit formally address the question of
whether an examiner's independent finding of a material reference can, or cannot,
cure intent to deceive. Duty to disclose is a frequent, and almost automatic, issue
during patent litigation. The examiner has, at hand, powerful computer searching
tools for finding prior art references, and readily finds obscure publications that the
inventor might hope remain obscure. In view of these facts, the author believes that
it is imperative that the Federal Circuit formally decide on this question.
38

6 Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Scripps Clinic &
Research Fund v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
387 Nos. 98-1152, 98-1182, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 994 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 1999).
388Id. at *14.
'389 927 F.2d 1565.
390Molins PLC,48 F.3d at 1190 (Nies, J., dissenting).
391Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. Nos. CV 90-93 MRP, CV 90-4823 MRP, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 729, at *27-28 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1995), affdinpart,rev'd in part, 87 F.3d 1559, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1996), vacated,520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
392 Id. at *114-15.
39:3
Id.
394 Id.

395 Id. at * 111.

396 Litton Sys., 87 F.3d at 1571.
397 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1231 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
398Id. at 1242.
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10. Late Submission ofa MaterialReference
Late submission of a material reference can lead to a finding of intent to deceive,
even though the reference was properly disclosed by way of an IDS. Buzzelli v.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.3 99 concerned a patent claiming methods for
setting hair. 400 Inequitable conduct was found where material references were
submitted at the last minute, that is, after the final fee had been paid, and only two
weeks before the patent issued. 4 1 There was a contributing issue, namely that the
examiner had never read or considered the reference. 40 2 This issue contributed to the
finding of inequitable conduct. 403 Similarly, late submission of a reference during the
40 4
prosecution of a reissue application was an issue in Bristol-MyersSquibb.

11. Infectious Unenforeeability
Where inequitable conduct occurs in the prosecution of a first patent application,
the doctrine of infectious unenforceability renders unenforceable related patents and
patent applications. From time to time, the doctrine of infectious unenforceability
40 5
has been identified with the Doctrine of Unclean Hands.
Infectious unenforceablity requires that there be an immediate and necessary
relation between the claims in the patent where inequitable conduct is found, and the
claims in the related patent. 406 A showing that the claims in the two patents are to
two different inventions, based on a showing that the claims were separated by a
restriction requirement, will not necessarily alone be sufficient to rebut a finding of
infectious unenforceability. 4 7 What is needed to rebut this finding is a showing that
40 8
the claims in the two patents are to mutually exclusive inventions.
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioseienee, N. V 409 concerned a patent that claimed
expression of Bacillus thuringiensistoxin ("BT toxin") in a plant cell. 410 The inventor
filed a Declaration swearing that he believed the invention would work in any plant
cell, even though he knew this statement to be false (the invention did not work for
the cells of the cotton plant).
The submission of this deceptive Declaration
411
constituted an act of inequitable conduct.

182 U.S.P.Q. 307 (E.D. Mich. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1975).
at 308.
401
Id. at 310.
39

400Id.

402 Id.

403_d. at 310-11.
401Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.

2003).
405
R.J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in PatentLitigation, 7 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 37, 99 (1993).
406 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 522, 537 (D.N.J. 2000).
407 Id. at 538.
408 Id. at 539.
40) 264 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mo. 2002), revd, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
410 Id. at 854.
411 Id. at 861-62.
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The court rendered the patent unenforceable, but also rendered all related
patents unenforceable (three related patents). 412 All four patents contained claims
encompassing any plant cells (all types of plant cells) (Table i). None of the claims
restrict the "plant cell" to any specific type of plant cell, such as a tobacco plant cell,
cotton plant cell, or tomato plant cell. The claim element "plant cell" or "plant cells"
encompasses cells from cotton, tobacco, tomato, wheat, and strawberry plants.
Because of inequitable conduct occurring in U.S. Patent No. 5,254,799, the court
rendered all four patents unenforceable.
Infectious unenforceability is thus
demonstrated because of the fact that inequitable conduct occurred during the
prosecution of the first patent, where the claims of the first patent contained an
413
identical element as in the three related patents.
Table 1. Infectious unenforceabiityin Monsanto v. Bayer
U.S. Pat. No.

Claim No.

5,254,799

1

5,545,565

14

5,767,371

13

Claim element encompassing any plant cell or all plant
cells.
41 4
"A plant cell ... which contains a chimeric gene."

4 5
"The chimeric gene ... expressed in plant cells. 1

"A plant cell comprising the chimeric gene of claim
1."416

"A method of protecting a plant cell from Lepidopteran

4 17
insects, comprising producing in said plant cell."

Will infectious unenforceability in a first patent result in a rendering of
unenforceability of the claims of a second, related patent if the claims in the second
patent had been amended or had been cancelled and replaced by new claims?
According to Baxter International,Inc. v. MeGaw, Inc.,418 cancellation or amendment
of a claim "tainted" by inequitable conduct will not excuse the patentee's intentional
419
failure to disclose material references.
The above situations are to be distinguished from the situation where the claims
in a second, related patent are in no way material to the patent in dispute. Here,
infectious unenforceability does not apply, and the second patent will not be rendered
unenforceable. In Baxter, the non-disclosed reference (Borla septum) was relevant
only to Baxter's claims to a septum. 420 Where the prosecution of a parent patent
(U.S. Patent No. 5,167,648; claims to septum) involved inequitable conduct,
infectious unenforceability applied only to U.S. Patent No. 5,171,234 (claims to
412
413
414
115

Id. at 862.
See id. at 854.
U.S. Patent No. 5,254,799, col.60 (filed July 23, 1990).
U.S. Patent No. 5,545,565, col.116 (filed May 22, 1995).

U.S. Patent No. 5,767,371, col.13 (filed June 2, 1995).
17U.S. Patent No. 6,107,546, col.61 (filed June 5, 1995).
418 149 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
419 Id. at 1332; see also Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("An applicant
who.., has withheld from the PTO prior art material to a claim in a parent application should not
be exculpated simply because, by fortuitous circumstances').
420 BaxterInt'l, 149 F.3d at 1331-32.
416
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septum), but not to U.S. Patent No. 5,158,554 (claims to blunt cannula but no claims
to septum) (Table 2). Inequitable conduct due to failure to disclose the Borla
reference (Borla septum) resulted in a rendering of unenforceable two patents
containing claims relating to a septum, but did not result in rendering unenforceable
of a related patent (5,158,554) containing claims to a blunt cannula, but containing
no limitation relating to "septum."
Monsanto and Baxter disclose clear-cut
applications of the dramatic doctrine of infectious unenforceabilty.
Infectious unenforceablity was also an issue in, for example, eSpeed, Inc. v.
BrokerTec USA., L.L.C.,4 21 where the lower court applied the doctrine, and where
the Federal Circuit did not reverse any component of the lower court's decision, but
422
affirmed on grounds other than infectious unenforceability.
Table 2. Infectious Unenforceability in Baxter International, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc.
U.S. Pat. No.

Claim No.

5,167,648

36

5,171,234

1

Claim with septum element
"A method making a pre-slit injection site having a
housing and a septum comprising the sequential steps
of: forming a fluid flow path through the housing;
inserting the septum into an end region of the housing;
applying radially directed resealing forces to the
septum. 4 23
"A method of effecting a transfer of a fluid to a receiver
using a resealable injection site with a per-slit [sic preslit] septum.

' 4 24

Claim not containing septum element
"A cannula ... comprising.., a distal end tube in the
form of a blunt piercing connector member." 425

12. Can Inequitable Conduct Earlyin the Prosecution of a PatentBe Curedby
Actions Taken Later on in the Prosecutionof the Same Patent?
Where a claim cancellation totally removes claims having relevance to the
non-disclosed material reference, intent to deceive can likely be cured by the
cancellation. According to Rule 56, "The duty to disclose information exists ... until
the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes
426
abandoned."

421

480 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

422

Id. at 1136-37.

423

U.S. Patent No. 5,167,648, cols.13-14 (filed June 11, 1990) (emphasis added).

424 U.S. Patent No. 5,171,234, cols. 11-12 (filed June 12, 1990) (emphasis added).
425

U.S. Patent No. 5,158,554, col.11 (filed June 12, 1990).

426 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006).
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Fox Industries,Inc. v. StructuralPreservationSystems, Inc. 427 sheds some light
on the notion that claim amendments or cancellation can relieve the duty to
disclose. 428 The applicant failed to disclose a reference (FX-70 sales brochure).429
Subsequently, the claims were amended, where the device shown by the FX-70 sales
brochure no longer had relevance to the device covered by the amended claim, that is,
to the claim in its new amended form.43 0 However, the court held that this
amendment did not cure the non-disclosure, as the sales brochure still had some
relevance to the other pending claims 3 1 The court found inequitable conduct, and
43 2
the patent was rendered unenforceable.

13 With Non -Disclosureof a MaterialReference, with Intent To Deceive, in a Parent
Application, Submission of the Same Reference in a DaughterApplication May or
May Not Cure the Deceptive Intent
Can timely disclosure of a material reference in a daughter patent application
cure deceptive non-disclosure of the same reference occurring during prosecution of
the parent application? In Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor
Materials America, Inc.,433 submission during prosecution of the daughter
succeeded,434 while in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,43 5 submission during
prosecution of the daughter failed to cure the intent that had occurred during
43 6
prosecution of the parent.
In Applied Materials, the applicant had withheld a material reference (Hart
patent), apparently with deceptive intent, during prosecution of a parent application
but later disclosed it during the prosecution of a daughter application.43 7 The court
43 8
held that disclosure of the prior art had cured the alleged misrepresentations.
The Cordis opinion held the parent patent unenforceable for the complete failure
439
to disclose the Hillstead reference during the prosecution of the parent application.
The court also held the daughter patent unenforceable because, even though
Hillstead was cited in the course of the prosecution of the daughter, it was cited in a
440
buriedform.
From the tenor of all the cases cited in this essay, it can be doubted that citation
of a non-disclosed reference in a daughter application can reliably cure non17 922 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1990), affg6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (D. Md. 1988).
428 Id.
at 803-04 (stating that the duty of candor and good faith extends throughout the
patent's prosecution, "in light of the amendments made to it" (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants v.
Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).
429 FoxIndus., Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1580.
4:30Id. at 1581.
431 Fox Indus. Inc., 922 F.2d at 804.
432 Id.
433 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1967 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff, 104 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
431 Id. at 1969.
435 194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002), rev'don othergrounds,339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

436

Id. at 368.

437 Applied Materials,30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1967.
438

Id. at 1969.

439

Cordi, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 367-68.
Id. at 368.

440
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disclosure with deceptive intent in the parent application. The best approach might
be to disclose the reference in the daughter application, where the filing includes an
explanation why the reference had not been disclosed in the parent application.

14. Disclosure or Citation of a Reference in a ParentApplication Can Cure Failure
To Disclose the Reference in the DaughterApplication
Failure to re-submit the previously disclosed references will not lead to a holding
of failure to fulfill the duty to disclose. 441 The best approach is to re-submit the IDS
in any daughter applications, but where there is no need to re-submit actual copies of
the references.

15. Examiner'sInitials
A number of cases have highlighted the fact that an examiner's initials, or lack
thereof, can be influential in reaching a finding of intent to deceive. 442

With

consideration of each reference, the examiner places her initials next to the name of
each reference. In some opinions, lack of initials can enhance an argument for intent
to deceive, while in other opinions, lack of initials were found not relevant to intent to
deceive. The Fiskars Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.443 opinion found that lack of
initials does not shed light on intent to deceive, writing that an applicant is not
444
required to tell the USPTO twice about the same prior art.

16. Descriptionof a Non -DisclosedReference by Way of Commentary,About the
Reference, in the Specification Can Cure Intent
Material references are properly disclosed by way of an IDS. Mere identification
of the reference somewhere in the specification of the patent cannot satisfy the duty

441 Seo,
e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that a
reference that was included in the parent patent's prosecution "need not to be resubmitted" in the
daughter patent); Advanced Respiratory, Inc. v. Electromed, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, 1051 (D.
Minn. 2002) (emphasizing that the prior art reference in the parent patent's application and
continuation is no basis for inequitable conduct); MPEP, supranote 45, § 609.02 ("Information which
has been considered by the Office in the parent application of a continued prosecution
application.., need not be resubmitted in the continuing application to have the information
considered and listed on the patent.").
442 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (articulating that the prior art at issue for inequitable conduct was deemed not to be read
because the examiner never initialed the reference); Toro Co. v. SCAG Power Equip., Inc., No.
8:01CV279, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 603, at *10 (D. Neb. Jan. 15, 2003) (involving whether an
examiner's initial of a prior art reference meant he had read the art); Lifescan, Inc. v. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (D. Del. 2000) (ruling that the material in questions was
considered by the examiner because of their initials).
443221 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
444Id. at 1327.
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to disclose. However, identification of the reference can be relevant to this duty, as it
can cure allegations of intent to deceive.
In Transelean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc., 445 the court observed that the
inventor had repeatedly identified the non-disclosed reference (Becnel patent) in the
447
specification. 446 The Becnel patent was identified at least nine times in the patent.
Because of the fact that the Becnel patent was identified many times in the
specification of the patent application, and because the examiner had penciled his
initials in the actual patent specification, right next to the description of the Becnel,
448
the court refrained from a holding of deceptive intent.
449
The same fact-pattern occurred in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
The inventor, Dr. Housey, had failed to disclose properly two references (Uehara and
Hsiao references) by way of an IDS.450 Although the opinion contained allegations of
deceptive intent, e.g., submitting fabricated data and failing to list the correct
inventors, the opinion observed that the inventor had identified the non-disclosed
references several times in the specification, and refrained from a holding of
deceptive intent in the non-disclosure. 451 Similarly, in PanduitCorp. v. Band-It-Idex,
Inc. 452 the court observed that a reference had also been prominently discussed in the
specification.

453

To conclude, the best approach in disclosure might be to submit all references
identified in the patent specification by way of an IDS. However, where an oversight
results in a non-disclosure, the patentee during litigation might find hope in saving
the patent by directing the court's attention to the specification's commentary about
the non-disclosed reference, or to the specification's repeated identification of the
reference.

17. An Applicant Can Cure His Own Intent Only If the ApplicantAlso Discloses
That a MisrepresentationHad Occurred-TheProcedureofRohm & Haas
Robin & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 454 illustrates the concept that once a
deceptive material omission has occurred, an inventor or applicant can try later to
cure the deceptive intent. 455 In Robin & Haas, an applicant had omitted herbicidal
456
test data in an affidavit submitted early in prosecution of a patent application.
The affidavit provided herbicidal test data from experiments conducted in May
445 No. 97-2298 (RLE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19870 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2000), aftd, 290 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
41 Id. at *6.
447 Id.
448 Id. at *11.
419 128 F. App'x 767 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
450 Id. at 770,
451Id. at 770-71 (vacating and remanding the district's decision of inequitable conduct because
the lower court clearly erred in deciding there was intent to deceive).
452 No. 00-C-1461, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11111 (N. D. Ill. June 23, 2000), affd, 25 F. App'x 836
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
453
Id. at *54-61.
454 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
455 Id. at 1572.
456 Id. at 1559.
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45
(springtime), but deceptively omitted test data generated in December (winter). 7
The court held that the affidavit contained misrepresentations, where these
misrepresentations were instrumental in persuading the examiner to allow the
claims. 458 At a later time during the prosecution of the patent, the applicant
disclosed the omitted test results, however, this disclosure failed to contain any
indication that there had earlier been a misrepresentation of the fact. 459 The court
held that the applicant's attempts to cure his own intent had failed because the
applicant failed to inform the USPTO of his own intent to deceive. 460 The Rohm &
Haas cure procedure requires submitting the earlier non-disclosed reference, but also
informing the USPTO of the intent to deceive the USPTO.
Li man v. Lehman,461 which cited and applied the cure procedure of Rohm &
Haab, did not involve any patent application. But it did involve the duty to disclose
information in the course of business conducted with the USPTO. 462 An attorney
(Lipman) was asked to submit a collection of affidavits to the USPTO in support of
the character of a patent attorney, Mr. Wallace. 463 After submitting the affidavits
(seventeen affidavits), four of the affiants sent Mr. Lipman a letter stating that they
changed their mind, and that the four affidavits should no longer be used by either
464
Mr. Lipman or by Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Lipman's problems began a few days later, when he submitted a petition in
support
of Mr. Wallace's character, where the petition referred to all
seventeen affidavits. 465 The petition referred to all seventeen affidavits even though
Mr. Lipman knew that four of affiants had changed their mind. 466 Mr. Lipman's
problems got even worse, about two months later, when he sent a letter to the
467
USPTO requesting that the patent office no longer rely on the four false affidavits.
In a nutshell, the problem was that Mr. Lipman had tried to cure his earlier
misrepresentation, but had not used the cure procedure of Rohm & Haas. What
Mr. Lipman had failed to do was to disclose that an actual misrepresentationhad
been made.468
The consequence was a threat of suspension directed to Mr.
469
Lipman.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, in Applied
Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials America, Inc., 470 also
considered the Rohm & Haascure procedure. 47 1 The court narrowly construed Robin
& Haas, and held that the Rohm & Haas cure procedure was not applicable where

Id. at 1560.
at 1571.
459 Id. at 1572-73.
460 Id. at 1573.
461 No. 95-0774 (RCL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10479 (D.D.C. July 19, 1996), afrd sub nom.
Lipman v. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
462 Id. at *4.
463 Id. at *2.
464 Id. at *3-4.
465 Id. at *5-7.
4
66 Id. at "18-22.
467 Id. at *10.
468 Id. at *25.
469 Id. at *29-30.
470 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1967 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affi,
104 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
471 Id. at 1969.
457

458 Id.
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the patent examiner could independently assess the veracity of the alleged
misstatements by examining the prior art.472 In Applied Materials,the non-disclosed
reference was a typical prior art patent, easily discovered by any examiner. The
author suggests that the Federal Circuit formally address the validity of the Rohm &
Haascure procedure, and speak on whether it applies only to prior art that is obscure
to the examiner, or if it also applies to prior art easily found by the examiner.

H. ConfidentialInformation
Regarding litigation, the case law provides a great deal of guidance on the duty
to disclose confidential materials and protection of these materials.
During
litigation, confidential documents are protected by doctrines such as attorney workproduct and attorney-client privilege. 47 3 However, guidance regarding the duty to
disclose confidential materials in proceedings before the USPTO is sparse. From the
available case law from the Federal Circuit, the consistent rule is that if the
confidential information has some bearing on the validity of the claims, then it
should be disclosed; but if it has only tangential relation to the claims and has no
direct bearing on claim validity, then it need not be disclosed. In other words, if
non-disclosed test results are only relevant to non-claimed aspects of the applicant's
research work, then the test results need not be disclosed.
47 4
In Jack Frost Laboratories,Inc. v. Physicians& Nurses ManufacturingCorp.,
the inventor had failed to disclose test results showing that the product, when made
of high density polyethylene, was inoperable. 475 What was inoperable was that when
the invention (a plastic bag) was microwaved for three minutes, the result was that
the bag ruptured. The patent claim read: "A microwave gel pack comprising: a
completely sealed envelope ...

[that does] not rupture or separate at the seams

thereof when subjected to said microwave energy for a period of time exceeding about
two minutes but not exceeding about four minutes." 47

6

The district court observed

that the test results demonstrated that the bag failed to meet the requirements of the
claim and, on this basis, held that the test results were material to the claims and
needed to be disclosed to the USPTO. 47 7

Intent to deceive was inferred by the

inventor's repeated lack of candor, which included failure to disclose the test results,
failure to disclose a sale, self-contradictory testimony during litigation, and

4,

Id.

473 In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp. 448 F.3d 1294, 1300-02 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Spalding

Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:
Continuing Confusion About Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-ExistingDocuments, and the
Source of the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 1001 (1999). See generallyJonathan G.
Musch, Attorney-Client Privilegeand the PatentProsecutionProeossin the PostSpalding World, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 175 (2003) (summarizing the history and current law on attorney-client privilege).
474 Nos. 96-1114, 96-1430, 96-1543, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26138 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 1997),
affg, 901 F. Supp. 718, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
475 I d. at *10-11.
476 U.S. Patent No. 4,756,311 col.6 1.46-64 (filed May 15, 1985).
477 Jack FrostLabs., 901 F. Supp. at 728.
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destruction of company records. 478
The court held for inequitable conduct and
479
rendered the patent unenforceable.
In Cargill,Inc. v. CanbraFoods, Ltd,480 the inventor failed to disclose laboratory
data ("oven data") which, if submitted, would have "stood in the way of portraying
IMC 130 [the invention] as something more than an incremental improvement. 4 1
Intent to deceive was inferred from the fact that there were "multiple occasions that
called for disclosure of the omitted data."48 2
The court rendered the patent
48 3
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
Prophetic examples are a conventional component of many patent applications.
Usually, the prophetic examples serve to supplement disclosures of existing examples
comprising actual laboratory data. In Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Biotechnology General Corp.,4 4 a patent was rendered unenforceable on the basis of a
prophetic example, where later-conducted research by the inventor demonstrated
that the prophetic example did not work. 48 5 The relevant forum for disclosing the
new laboratory data was an Interference Proceeding conducted at the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences. A contributing factor to the finding of inequitable
conduct was the fact that the prophetic example was disclosed, in the patent, in the
past tense. 48 6 Disclosing a prophetic example in the past tense generally results in
harsh consequences for the patentee.
In Syntex (USA.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 48 7 the adverse party accused the patent
owner of failing to disclose results with a chemical called oxtoxynol 12.5.488 The
adverse party argued that the court should render the patent invalid for inequitable
conduct. The court observed that the non-disclosed test results had some relevance
to the field of research, and could be interpreted as establishing some weakness in
the applicant's research, but were not relevant to aspects of this work described by
490
the claims. 48 9 The court refrained from finding inequitable conduct.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 491 and the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware in Applera Corp. v. Miromass UK Ltd.,492 held that non-disclosed
confidential laboratory data was non-material, as the data was not relevant to the
claims.49

Id. at 729.
479Jack FrostLabs., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26138, at *19.
480 476 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
481 Id. at 1367.
482 Id.at 1366.
483 Id.at 1362.
484 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
485Id.at 1362.
486 Id.at 1361.
487 407 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
488 Id.at 1377.
489 Id.at 1383.
490 Id. at 1385.
491 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
492 204 F. Supp. 2d 724 (D. Del. 2002), affd, 60 F. App'x 800 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
49 Eli Lily & Co., 471 F.3d at 1383; Appkera Corp., 204 F. Supp. at 762-64.
478
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In Senior Industries,Inc. v. Thomas & Betts Corp.,494 the inventor, Mr. Franks,
had knowledge of a prior art device (the Graves invention) but did not disclose the
Graves invention to the USPTO. 495 Mr. Franks possessed a rough drawing of the
Graves invention as well as a letter stating that the Graves invention preceded his
own by several years. 496 The rough drawing was a confidential document, and was
not a publication available to the public.

497

Mr. Franks had also signed the non-

disclosure agreement, which precluded him from divulging information. 498 The nondisclosure agreement shows that the Graves invention was not in the public
knowledge. 499 Although the court did not find enough in George Franks' activities to
support a finding of intent to deceive the USPTO, 50 0 the opinion, in dicta, wrote the
court does not condone the withholding of potentially important information where
doubt exists and the filing party unilaterally decides that the information should not
50 1
be considered.
CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup International Corp.50 2 described several categories of
confidential laboratory data, where the data was negative and not disclosed: (1) nondisclosed data that is negative but does not contradict the claims 5 03 ; (2) non-disclosed
data that is negative to the extent that it does not render the claim non-enabled, but
merely shows that the invention does not give results good enough to guarantee
commercial success; (3) non-disclosed data that is negative to the extent that it
proves that the claim is non-enabled and should result in invalidation under
35 U.S.C. § 112; and (4) non-disclosed data that is negative to the extend that it is
contrary to other, better data, submitted to the USPTO to support arguments that
the invention is non-obvious. 50 4 CFMTsuggested that the first and second data types
are not material, while the third and fourth data types are material and should be
disclosed to avoid a holding of inequitable conduct. 50 5
Non-disclosure of a
confidential document, an Abstract presented at a scientific meeting, was also an
50 6
issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Lahoratorie.
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. PharmaciaBioteeh, Inc. 50 7 concerned the failure
to disclose confidential information, where this information took the form of details of
ongoing communications between collaborators. 508 Communications with an outside
collaborator, contractor, or custom manufacturer, are generally confidential.

191 No. 98-C-5842, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18995 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2002).
495 Id. at *45-46.
496 Id. at *46, *52.

497 Id. at *53.
498 Id.
499 Id
5o

Id. at *54.

501

Id1

502 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

503 In CFMT, the data did not contradict the claims because the non-disclosed experimental
setup lacked one of the elements required by the claims, where the claims required a closed system
to protect from dust, and the omitted element in the experimental setup was the closed system. Id.
at 1337.
ro04Id. at 1342.
o05See generallyid. at 1342 (discussing non-disclosure of negative test data).
506G
90 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529 (D.N.J. 2000).
507 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
oS Id. at 1319.
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The inventors listed on the patent for a particle used for perfusive
chromatography were Drs. Afeyan, Regnier, and Dean. 5° 9 These inventors had
invented a coating for the claimed particle. 510 But the particle itself was made by
another party, namely, Drs. Warner and Lloyd of Polymer Labs. 511 Unfortunately for
these three named inventors, they had failed to disclose their collaboration with the
scientists at Polymer Labs, a collaboration that had included frequent
conversations.

512

The Federal Circuit held that a disclosure of the true nature of the relationship
between the two groups of scientists would have been important to a reasonable
examiner's consideration of the inventorship question, and held that the patent
513
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
Where an applicant chooses to disclose proprietary information or a trade secret,
the USPTO suggests labeling the information as such in a sealed, labeled envelope,
and submitting a petition to expunge the citation. 514 The sealed envelope should
contain a label reading, "PROPRIETARY MATERIAL NOT OPEN TO PUBLIC. TO
BE OPENED ONLY BY USPTO EXAMINER.

DO NOT SCAN."515

However, if the

examiner actually considers the proprietary information or trade secret to be
516
material, the petition to expunge will be denied.
Applicants should refrain from disclosing information that is subject to a
confidentiality agreement. For example, data resulting from collaboration between
an inventor from Company A and an inventor from Company B might be subjected to
such an agreement. The issue is that the file history can become publicly available at
the time that the application is published or at the time that the patent issues. The
duty of confidentiality towards a third party, and the duty to disclose to the USPTO,
represent potential conflicting duties. As observed by Simone A. Rose and Debra R.
Jessup, this conflict is distinguished by the fact that breach of confidentiality can
517
result in suspension, while non-disclosure can result in inequitable conduct.

I Non -Uniform Application By the Courts of the Two Standardsof Materiality
According to the USPTO, a goal of the March 1992 amendment to Rule 56 was to
provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the burden of litigation on the
question of inequitable conduct. 518 However, the decade following this amendment
has been characterized by uneven application of the new standard by the courts.

509 Id.at 1317.
51o
Id.at 1319.
511Id.

512Id.
513Id.at 1322-23.

514MPEP,supra note 45, § 724.02.
515Id.
o516
Id.§§ 724.02, 724.05; Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goals, 63 Fed. Reg.
53,498 (Oct.5, 1998), 1215 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 87 (Oct.27, 1998).
517Simone A. Rose & Debra R. Jessup, Whose Rules Rule? Resolving Ethical Conflicts During
the Simultaneous Representation of Clients in Patent Prosecution, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 571, 573-74
(2003).
olS Duty of Disclosure, supra note 15, at 2023.
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The Federal Circuit, as well as the U.S. District Courts, has taken non-uniform
approaches to the pre-March 1992 and post-March 1992 standards. For patents
prosecuted before March 1992, nearly all courts properly described/applied the preMarch 1992 standard, though in a few cases, the court has improperly
described/applied the post-March 1992 standard.
For patents prosecuted entirely after March 1992, some courts have
described/applied either the pre-March 1992 standard while other courts have
described/applied the post-March 1992 standard. Here, courts using the earlier
standard can be considered to be anti-patent holder courts, while the courts using the
latter standard are pro-patent holder, relative to each other.
In some cases, the court described or applied an aggregated standard, where
application of the aggregated standard has the same effect as applying only the preMarch 1992 standard. Thus, courts using the aggregated standard can be considered
anti-patent holder.

1. Pro-PatentingandAnti-Patenting Courts
From the Federal Circuit, Molins PLC v. Textron Inc., 519 Life Technologies, Inc.
v. Clon tech Laboratories,Inc., 520 and Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF BuildingMaterials
Corp.,521 concerned patents prosecuted entirely before March 1992, where these
courts properly described (or described and applied) only the pre-March 1992
standard.
In Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,522 from the Federal Circuit,
the patent was prosecuted entirely after March 1992, but the court described only the
pre-March 1992 standard, hence this court could be construed as anti-patenting.
Similarly, in cases from the U.S. district courts, DaimlerChryslerAG v. Feuling
Advanced Technologies, Inc., 523 Emerson Electric Co. v. Spartan Tool, L.L.C.,524
Schnadig Corp. v. Collezione Europa U.S.A.,525 and Ashland Products, Inc. v. Truth
Hardware Corp.,526 were anti-patenting.
In contrast, in other instances, the courts have applied only the post-March 1992
standard. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, in
Applera Corp. v. Micromass UKLtd.527 concerned a patent filed in November 1989, a
time when the Federal Circuit and USPTO both utilized the broad standard.
However, the opinion blatantly applied a very narrow standard of materiality. The
court held that a non-disclosed reference was not material, despite the fact that the
examiner had initially found it highly relevant to the claims. 528 To view the complete
picture, the court held the non-disclosed reference to be not material, because "that
51948 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
520224 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
521168 F.33d 28 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
522 267 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
52 276 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
524 223 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
525 No. 01-C-1697, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19083 (N.D. I1. Oct. 2, 2002).
526 No. 99C5786, 2003 U.S. Dist Lexis 11362 (N.D. I1. July 1, 2003).
527 204 F. Supp. 2d 724 (D. Del. 2002), affd, 60 F. App'x 800 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
528

Id. at 760.
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rejection was subsequently withdrawn,"529 adding that, "[t]o base a finding of
materiality solely on the Examiner's initial assessment of the prior art, without
considering the bases ... or reasonableness of the rejection, would make material
every prior art reference on which a rejection ... is based."53 0 This court can be
construed as pro-patent holder, even though its application of the law appears
incorrect. To give another example, in Novadigm, Inc. v. Marimba, Inc.,531 the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California held that only the post-March
1992 standard could be applied for patents prosecuted solely after March 1992.532
This court also could be viewed as pro-patent holder. Courts selectively applying the
post-March 1992 standards to patents prosecuted entirely after March 1992 can be
construed as being pro-patent holders, where these courts included Novadigm, Beam
Laser Systems, Inc. v. Cox Communications,Inc.,533 Eastern America Trio Products,
Inc. v. Tang Electronic Corp.,53 4 Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access,
Inc.,535 Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,536 and
53 7
Strandtek International,Inc. v. Minnesota Mining andManufacturing,Inc.
A conclusion can be made regarding the U.S. District Courts-for patents
prosecuted entirely after March 1992, most of the courts have described only the preMarch 1992 standard, and thus most of the courts were anti-patenting.
A number of cases have concerned two patents, one prosecuted before March
1992, and the other entirely after March 1992. In Beam Laser, the court described
both pre-March 1992 and post-March 1992 standards as two separate standards, and
surgically applied these two separate standards to two respective patents (the '883
and '825 patents), one prosecuted before and the other after March 1992, writing that
the first standard for materiality applies to the '883 patent, and the second applies to
the '825 patent. 538 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
53 9
York has also surgically separated the application of both standards.
In contrast, an aggregated, or combined, standard has been set forth in a
number of cases, i.e., a standard where the court is free to pick and choose among
elements of the aggregated standard, and decide which part to apply. For example,
in Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co.,540 an early case from the
Federal Circuit, the court set forth an aggregated standard. 541 This opinion, as well
as the more recent Digital Control Inc. v. CharlesMachine Works,542 characterized
the aggregated standard as one where the threshold of materiality can be established
by any one of four tests. 543 In other words, the aggregated standard is one where the
529

Id.

, Id.
5 No. C-97-20194-JW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2315 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2000).
532 Id.
at *6n.1.
5
No. 2:00-cv-195, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11864 (E.D. Va. June 27, 2001).
531 97 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
5
120 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
53 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
537 No. 1:99-CV-961, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17552 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2000).
5 Id. at *10 n.3.
5) 97 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
540 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
541
542

Id. at 14.

437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
at 1314-15.

543 Id.
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court is free to pick and choose among the available standards, and to apply the
chosen standard.

CONCLUSION

Materiality is the first prong of inequitable conduct, as it applies to the duty to
disclose. However, the Federal Circuit has refrained from providing guidance as to
the proper standard for materiality. By writing, "We leave for another day a final
disposition of this issue,"5 44 the Federal Circuit has admitted that an uncertainty
exists regarding the two separate standards for the duty to disclose. Lack of
guidance has also resulted from the Federal Circuit committing itself to the narrow
administrative law standard in some opinions, 545 but abandoning this stance in later
opinions. As documented in this essay, the Federal Circuit appears to prefer the coexistence of both standards of materiality. The end effect is that the narrower postMarch 1992 standard has been made redundant in the context of the federal courts
(though not in the context of proceedings before the USPTO). In other words, the
aggregated standard subsumes the narrower standard and is, in effect, exactly the
same as the broader standard.
This uncertain standard has influenced the primary behavior of patent
applicants, where the result, at least in the biotechnology arts, is the frequent
submission of Information Disclosure Statements supplying a great number of
references. The problem with submitting fifty to one-hundred or more references is
that it places an undue burden on the examiner and likely compromises the quality
in the examination process.
Intent to deceive is the second prong of inequitable conduct. Intent is almost
always established by evidence that the applicant was repeatedly exposed to the
reference in question, and only rarely established by the direct evidence of a
"smoking gun." The case law suggests at least two avenues for mitigating alleged
intent, namely, the examiner's independent finding of the non-disclosed reference,
and the Rohm & Haas cure procedure. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not
provided consistent guidance on these two avenues. The author suggests that the
Federal Circuit formally address the question of whether an examiner's independent
finding of a material reference can, or cannot, cure intent to deceive. Also, the author
suggests that the Federal Circuit formally address the validity of the Rohm & Haas
cure procedure relating to an inventor's ability to cure her own deceptive intent, and
speak on whether it applies only to prior art that is obscure to the examiner, or if it
also applies to prior art easily found by the examiner.

Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 410 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reht granted,
438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
544
545

